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ABSTRACT 
,, ,,;._. 
This thesis de~onstrates certain patterns of b.ehavior . 
which arise as a result of a Great ?ower seeking to fulfill 
its obligations to a client state through a defensive military 
corrnni tment • 
The underlying assumptions and definitions of basic term-
inology employed by this thesis are explained before proced-
ing with the analysis. The noet i 1nportant assumptions uti-
, 
lized by this thesis is that a Great ?ower rivalry is in ex-
istence and that the Great Powers conduct their policies with 
respect to each other within the li m ts of an operative deter-
rent. Great Powers are defined as those nations which possess 
vast 1ni li tary capabilities, interests of a global nature and 
enough nuclear power to be enable to inflict unacceptable da-
mage to any attacker, even if it r,1ust resort to a second strike 
retaliation. 
The analysis then :noves into an identification of the 
principle of com.ntrfient credibility and th.e value which has 
been placed on this concept by the decision-makers of Great 
Powers. The thesis places particular e;.aphasis upon the role 
played by the principle of co(runitment credibility in the U.S. 
decision to beco:ne involved in Vietnam. 
The policies undertaken by Great Powers in the fulfill-
. 1 
• 
'· 
"Ilent of their obligations resulting fro:n defensive military 
comrni t:--nents are exa;nined in the next oortion of the thesis. •. L 
These policies are analysed by an evaluation of the risks under-
taken by the Great Power in its efforts to :.aaxirnize its co:nrnit-
ment credibility. One of the rnajor conclusions of this por-
tion of the thesis is that the degree of risk involved in 
such policies of the Great Power varies considerably and is de-
pendent upon the origin of threat to the client state. 
The case of li·nited wars is then undertaken. Here it is 
asserted that although a Great Power r!l9Y becorne involved in 
such conflicts in order to preserve the credibility of all its 
comrni tm.ents, if the coat of that ·~ower' s involve::nent reaches 
a certain point, the Power's fulfi llrnent of the co~a~'.li_ t.-nent at that 
cost wi 11 have a detrimental, instead of beneficial, ef'fect on 
that ?ower' s overall co:nrai t:nent credi bi li ty. 
How a Power should withdraw fron1 such costly involvements 
is explored in the next chapter. It i_s determined that the 
Power, in order to maxi:nize its overall corru.rd.tment credibility, 
' . 
should reduce the expenditure of the co!nponent of cost which 
produces the most darnaging effect on the credibility of the 
Power I s other com~ni trnents. 
As this thesis is an effort· in working towards a theory 
of nation-state behavior in the fulfill:~ent of military cornadt-
ments, the conclusf..ons of this study de·uonstrate how this the-
sis has worked towards this goal and what work re111ains to be 
done. 
2• .. . 
~ .-:--
INTRODUCTION 
This thesis is the culmination of nearly two years of 
research by this writer into nation-state behavior in the ful-
fillrnent of national :nilitary commitments. The first case 
study exa:rrl.ned by this stu.ient was the British withdrawal from 
Southeast Asia after the Second 1,~orld tflar. The paper which 
was produced on the topic, uThe Erosion of Co:n1.:d trnent: Test 
Case and Hypotheses", suggested tentative guidelines which, it 
was felt, were necessary to be followed if a nation's with-
drawal from a co·rru t,nent were to be considered 11 successful 11 • 
As a logical change of pace, this writer next explored co;.n-
mi tn1ent escalation and exam ned in considerable detai 1 the Uni-
ted States coJ1ini t nent to Ethiopia, :..\brocco and Spain. Valuable 
resouce material on these co·n.ni t·:nents was available because of 
the Symington sub-comrni ttee investigation of moat of the United 
States security agree:?1ents and co1::.·ni t:nents abroad. 
Since that study, this writer has fairly thoroughly re-
searched the Soviet co·:anitment to Egypt and the United States 
COCT1nitrnent to Pakistan. Both of these studies attracted this 
student's attention because of their enigmatic nature. The 
Soviet decision to further embroil themselves in the Arab-
Israeli hostilities in 1967 and 1970 sti~nulated this writer's 
curiosity in his exa1nnation of nation-state behavior in the 
'f., 
~' . 
. - 't 
fulfillr"'lent of .rm.litary comut:nents. Likewise, the almost 
total collapse of the Pakistani-U.S. alliance in the 1960 1 s, 
despite the fact that in the decade preceding Pakistan was con-
sidered one of .Ar1erica's closest allies, necessitated an exam-
ination by this student. 
This thesis, then, is an atte(Ilpt by this writer to gather 
the data exa(!rl.ned in these case studies, organize it and evalu-
ate it. Data ste:nining fro11 the U.S. involve£nent in South Viet-
nam. and several other Anerican co:nmi trnents has been employed. 
It is hoped that such eff'orts can work towards a :nore co11plete 
under st anding of nation-state behavior in the fulfil l1nent of 
military co~-1 rd t:nents. 
Finally, this writer wishes to express his appreciation 
to Jr. Carey B. Joynt for his guidance and assistance during 
the past several years. Several of his concepts have been e:n-
ployed in this thesi e and have been accredited to him. If these 
concepts have been misinterpreted, sole responsibility must 
rest with t hi s student • 
J,.,~· 
~IJII·. 
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ASSU:~?TIONS AND VEFINITIONS 
It seems appropriate that an analysis of nation-state be-
havior in the extension and protection of military commitments 
concern itself with an examination ·of the apparent relation-
ships inherent in a Great Power rivalry. Not only is such a 
situation interesting as it involves military and political 
considerations of a global nature, it is an extremely relevant 
area of study for it is precisely upon such rivalries that 
the future structure of international relations depends. 
Before beginning, however, it is important to mention the 
basic assumptions as well as the important definitions which 
are to be employed in this analysis. Without such an approach, 
any analysis runs the risk of encompassing amorphous propor-
tions which yield little or no practical utility. 
The underlying assumption behind this entire theeis is 
that there are Great Power rivalries and that the Great Powers 
participate in military rivalries by extending and supporting 
military commitments to client states. Logically, there is no 
reason why these rivalries accompanied by such behavior have 
to occur in the present international system. The possi bi li ty 
that someday a total accomodation among nations wi 11 be achieved 
cannot be ruled out. In fact, such a world community is the 
ultimate goal of practically every international organization 
5 
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and certainly earns the moral support of every peace loving per-
son in the world. Unfortunately, however, such a utopian com-
munity is not in existence today_. 
Great Powers have in the past and continue in the present 
to perceive their peers as potential if not actual rivals for 
power or prestige. Regardless of the context of the struggle, 
rivalries do occur. In the economic sphere, the economic Great 
Powers of Japan, the United States and Western Europe have of-
ten formulated their monetary and commercial policies in ef-
forts to protect their economies from foreign encroachment. 
Such attitudes further intensify an atmosphere of hostility 
and rivalry: Japan's obstinacy in revaluating the yen is a 
case in point. Despite great progress since the Second World 
War in formulating rules of behavior in the international mone-
tary system, many of the participants in the system confuse 
the benefits of economic protection with the long range pay-
offs of certain sacrifices made to assure a universal economic 
prosperity. 
In the military arena of' international behavior such at-
titudes of rivalry have not only prevailed, they are the basis 
of policy planning and budgetary determination for every coun-
try with significant military strength. The primary purpose 
for any government must be the survival of the nation-state of 
which it is a part. In a world glutted with highly efficient 
weaponry, capable of eliminating the entire species of man in 
a matter of a few hours, high premiums must be paid by govern-
6 
. ,· 
ments in an effort to ensure the survival of its territory. 
Despite these costs, "absolute securi\y" remains an un-
attainable possession for any nation-state. As such, govern-
ments often view policies pursued by other nations as inimical 
or threatening to their own existence or interests when in fact 
they are not. This becomes especially true when the states in-
volved each possesses the capability to obliterate the exis-
tence of the other. To ensure as great a margin of safety as 
possible, states in this situation will seek to protect their 
interests against other potentially threatening states. The 
most assured means of protection is the employment of military 
might. The interplay of such policy and motivations can· easily 
evolve into military rivalries by nation-etatee. 
Two Great Powers, without a common heritage or history, 
would be especially prone to such developments. With their own 
enormous bases of military, economic and industrial strength, 
their stakes and interests are not only globally oriented, they 
are often in conflict. Such friction ie a result of the simple 
fact that the amount of space and resources on this planet are 
necessarily limited. A behavior pattern of rivalry, then, 
would be apt to follow as each Great Power will be eager to pro-
tect its global interests not only for its own benefit, but 
to exclude the other Power from profiting from these interests. 
If one Power acouired a stake previously held by the other Power, 
it could affect the relative strength of the two nations. 
neither Power, then, would desire to lose an intere·st to the 
7 
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other Power, both Powers would be motivated to protect their 
interests through the most efficlent means available. Such 
means often include identification with a stake through the ex-
tension of a defensive military commitment. 
Such Great Power behavior is vividly demonstrated by the 
established practice of nation-states since the years of the 
Secon<t World War. The Cold War is a Great Power -rivalry as 
both the United States and the Soviet Union are competing with 
each other for influence and power throughout the world. Be-
fore the Sino-Soviet split, this struggle pitted the United 
States against the Communist monolith in an effort to contain 
·. the limit of Communist expansion. After the emergence of the 
Sino-Soviet estrangement, the u.s. rivalry with the ·communist 
nations was coupled with an ever-intensifying U.S.S.R.-Red 
China rivalry. 
These rivalries resulted in the deployment of' military 
power aroung the world in an effort to protect existing inter-
ests from falling under the control of perceived rival(s) - at 
least whenever the Powers were capable of doing so. It 
was no accident that the United States ini.tiated the greater 
part of its military commitments at the height of the Cold War 
(the late 194o's and early 1950's,up until the pronouncement 
by the Kremlin of "peaceful co-existence".) It was during 
this period that the United States committed itself to Europe 
through NATO, Southeast Asia through SEA.TO, associated itself 
with the defense of several Middle !astern countries through 
8 
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its indirect role in CENTO. It was only aft•r the outbreak 
of fighting in Korea that the United States decided to protect· 
the Republic of China _through a firm military commitment. Af-
ter Western Europe was frozen under the military aegis of NA.TO, 
the Soviets responded with their own explicit commitment, the 
. Warsaw Pact. 
The underlying assumption, ther~fore, that Great Power ri-
valries exist an_~ t.h,at Great Powers often extend military com-
................... ,. ... ,, 
mitments to protect existing interests against their rivals 
is not only logically valid, it is clearly realistic. As such, 
.. 
the subsequent analysis is more than an intellectual exercise, 
• 
it is vitally relevant to the study of international relations. 
It is necessary to comment very briefly on one further as-
sumption which this thesis finds imperative to ernploy. In the 
pages to follow, it ie assumed that Great Powers wi 11 not pur-
sue policies which guarantee the devestation of: their homeland. 
The recognition of this concept is very important ae it 
ascribes a certain degree of rationality to the decision-ma-
kers who control policy in the nation-states of Great Power sta-
tus. What follows, then, is an acknowledgement of the fact that, 
although Great Powers wi 11 sometimes formulate policy which 
may risk the devestation of their territory, there is a point 
of risk which is clearly prohibitive. Such a point would be 
where the risk underta..l.cen would certainly result in the deves-
tation of their homeland. 
Where this prohibitive level of risk exists and what fac-
9 
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tors determine it will be the subject of further analysis later 
in this thesis. Suffice it for now to merely recognize the ex-
istence of some restraints upon Great Power behavior. Great 
Powers will be deterred from certain policies if they believe 
the result of such oolicies will be the assured destruction of ' L 
their territory. The recognition of' this concept is vital to 
the analysis in the subsequent pages. 
In addition, it should be noted that this assumption re-
flects the actual behavior of nation-states. The "age of de-
terrence" has dominated international relations in recent years. 
Both the United States and the Soviet Union have employed con-
siderable restraint in their foreign policies as they both are 
~earful of instituting policies which may cause the other to 
launch a full-scale nuclear war upon themselves. The U.S. 
restraint during the crises in the Soviet dominated region of 
' 
Eastern Europe in the years 1956 and 1968 is a case in point. 
An example of a similar Soviet reetraint would be the Soviet re-
fusal in the past years to supply an offensive capability to 
the Egyptians which would enable them to completely obliterate 
Israel. There are, then, certain restraints operative upon 
Great Powers in their formation of policy in today's world • 
. With the basic assumptions for this analysis established, 
1 t is now appropriate to list several key definitions which 
will _clarify certain terms which will occur frequently through-
out this thesis. 
10 
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Certainly, the most fundamental word to this thesis is 
the word "commitment" itsel:r. On June 25, 1969, the United 
States Senate defined the term "national commitment" as 
follows a 
" ••• the use of armed forces on foreign 
territory, or a promise to assist a for-
eign country, govern~ent or people by 
the use of armed forces or financial re-
sources ••• , either immediately or upon 
the happening of certain events, •••. u 1 
It is this definition of the word "commitment" which this thesis 
shall employ. As a national military commitment it is under-
stood that the use of armed forces on another country's ter-
ritory and the promise for.future assistance will be employed 
in order to protect that state from a military attack of any 
kind. 
It is important to note three very different concepts 
all of which are included in this definition of a national 
military commitment. 
First, is merely "the use of armed forces on foreign 
territory". Whatever, then, the actual reason for the use of 
such troops, their actual presence constitutes a commitment. 
These troops need not be in a combatant role. Indeed, often 
they are used merely to protect an existing stake in the re-
gion by either acting as a deterrent or as a very real de-
fensi ve capability to preserve the stake. Any stationing 
of military personne.l i.n a region, therefore constitutes a 
lcurrent History. Vol. 57, No. ~~6 (August 1969), p. 128 
11 
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national military comnd tment. 
The second important point to note about this definition 
of a military coa~itment is that a promise for some future ac-
tion is, in itself, a commitment. There need not be any ma-
terial identification between the state extending a commitment 
and a nation receiving it. ! pledge alone is sufficient to 
commit one nation to another. 
Finally, a commitment is also the fulfillment of that 
pledge "either immediately or upon the happening of certain 
events". As such, both the employment of armed forces and 
financial resources may be utilized to achieve such a fulfill-
ment. In this case, the commitment becomes more than just a 
promise, it is the carrying forth of that promise. 
t•stakes" are whatever interests a Power wishes to protect 
by involving itself with a commitment in the first place. As 
is evident from the above definition of "cornroitmenttr, this stake 
often becomes the territorial integrity of another state. 
ncororoi tment protection•' is the support of any cornroi tment 
by a guarantor state {the state extending the commitment)to a 
client state (the recipient of the commitment). In cases 
where the commitment merely involves the stationing of troops 
abroad, such a protection would include th·e necessary materiel 
needed to ~aintain the _existing troop · level. If a promise 
for future action represents the nature of the commitment under-
taken by the Great Power, then the maintenance 09 the credi-
bility of' that promise protects the commitment. If the com-
12 
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mi tment is set into motion by the occurance of certain events 
which threaten the territorial integrity of the client state, 
then the protection of the com;nitment is achieved by the ful-
fillment of the commitment to protect the client state. 
ls only corn~i tments of a defensive nature are implied in 
the above de~initions, the evaluation of risks in this thesis 
will employ the factors inherent in "negative risk-taking". 
Negative risk-taking is distinguished from positive risk-taking 
as the former applies to situations in whi-ch nations wish to 
protect certain stakes while the latter is associated with ef-
forts to win new stakes. 1 
In arral7sing the risk inherent in the protection of a com-
mitment, a Great Power is likely to evaluate the following fac-
'11:E.r 
tors: 1.) What is the probability that a Power will~its obliga-
tions of a commitment if it is challenged by the other Power1 
2.) What will be loet or gained if that Power yields the stake 
without a fight? 3.) What wi 11 be lost or gained if that Po-
wer loses the stake with a fight? 4.) What will be lost or 
gained if that Power holds the stake with a fight12 When the 
subject of risk~taking emerges in this thesis, it shall be 
these principles which will be the basia f'r.mnework for analysis. 
One final definition. As has been implied, a "Great Pow·er" 
is any nation with vast resources, global interests, and enough 
1 
Lecture by .Dr. Carey B. Joynt, Lehigh University (11/10/70). 
2 
ibid., (Author's application in present· context.) 
1~ 
v·· 
military might to significantly deter an opponent. This the-
sis asserts that in terms of this military definition of a 
Great Power, only two nations in the world today are truly 
Great Powers - the United States and the Soviet Union. No 
nation compares with the scale of strength possessed by these 
two giants. 
.. 
14 
·' 
CO !t\fi T :.fEI'IT CREJI BI LI TY 
A commitment in order to be effective must be believed. 
b a commitment is a pledge to support the defense of a ter-
ritory or region, if it is felt that the promise itself is 
worthless, the securitity of that particular area is subsequent-
ly plac'ed.irr jeopardy. ~~oreover, if the security of the guar-
antor state depends on the territorial integrity of that re-
gion, its own security is in a likewise manner threatened. 
It is important, then, for a guarantor state to maintain 
the credibility of ite commitments with respect to at least 
three, sometimes four, parties. The first party would be the 
individual recipient of any one of the guarantor state's ·se-
curity commitments, the client state. 
For the guarantor state' e commitment to the client state 
to remain credible, the client state would have to be sure that: 
1.) the guarantor state's troops on its soi 1 {if any) do in-
deed protect or defend it from an attack; 2.) the guarantor 
state's promise to assist it would be capable of being fulfilled; 
and ~.) the guarantor state would indeed be willing to fulfill 
the ob ligatione of the commitment. 
In a similar manner, the credibility of the guarantor 
state's commitment in this client state vis-a-vis the guarantor• s 
chief rival would have to be maintained. 
15 
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If the rival of a 
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Great Power believed that the Great Power" guarantor state 
would and could come to the defense of a client state, that 
Power would be effectively deterred from launching an overt 
attack upon the client state. To do so, would almost cer-
tainiy run the risk of starting a nuclear war. As it is 
assumed that a deterrent between the Great ?owere is in opera-
tion, it follows that the firm maintenance of a Great Power's 
defensive commitment's credibility would significantly enhance 
the security of both the client and guarantor states. 
The third party to which the co::nmi tment would have to 
appear credible in order to ehha:nce the security of the client 
state would be the threatening rival(s) of that client state. 
{If the client state has only one rival which·'threatens its 
security and this nation is the same Power as the chief rival 
of the guarantor state, then the above paragraph also applies 
to this case.) This rival of the client state need not be a 
Great Power and could be very likely a small nation of third 
or fourth rank. 
This, then, is a very different situation than the rela-
tionship which exists between the two Great Powers in their 
mutual evaluation of each other's com.Y?rl.tments. Neither Great 
Pow.er dares to intrude overtly upon the other's territory to 
which it is committed as such action could trigger an inter-
national nuclear war. A third nation, however, especially 
· if it is already the recipient a eecuri ty commitment by a 
Great Power is not under such restraints. Because this nation 
16 
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could realize that - if it has a strong commitment with a Great 
Power and if it exercises a great degree of control over its 
own military might - if it were so motivated, it could launch 
an overt attack upon the client state. In such a situation, 
this third power would hope that the guarantor state would not. 
risk an al 1-out attack upon it, because of its firm i dentifi-
cation with the other Great ?ower. Such an attack could per-
petrate a nuclear holocaust. 
It should be clear that the problem of maintaining a guar-
antor's commitment credibility in such a situation would be dif-
ficult indeed. If the guarantor state ie called upon to ful-
fi 11 its commjtment, it would not be able to employ the power 
which would·be most efficient in returning security to the cli-
ent state. There would be certain restraints placed on the 
guarantor's actions, restraints which could hamper its ability 
to fulfill the commitment. In addition, because these client 
state rivals are not as easily deterred as a Great Power, it 
would follow that a guarantor state would be called on to ful-
fi 11 this type of com:nitment more often than those commitments 
which successfully deter a Great Power. In fact, such situa-
tions have occurred in recent years. The United States in-
volvement in Southeast Asia and the Soviet Union's experience 
in Egypt are two pertinent examples and will receive consi-
derable attention throughout this thesis. 
The fourth party which is vitally affected by the mainten-
ance of a guarantor state's commitment credibility to one client 
17 
state includes all of the other client states to which the 
guarantor state is committed. In other words, if the guaran-
tor state should fail to keep one of its pledges, the credi-
bility of all of its pledges would suffer. 
As such, a "pri n ci p 1 e of commitment i ndi vi ei bi li ty" em er-
g es in which each fulfillment of a commitment becomes a test 
case for the guarantor's resolve and ability to fulfill all 
of' its commitments. There exist certain limitations in the 
application of this principle and these will be explored later 
in this thesis. But it does follow logically that if. a guar-
antor state fails to fulfill a specific obligation in a commit-
ment, other nations which also depend on the guarantor et1ate 
for their security, will question the integrity of the commit-
ment. 
The maintenance of a guarantor state's commitment credi-
bility, then, logically appears to be important to a guarantor. 
state. The significance of this concept can be amply demonstra-
ted by a quick review of some of the more important aspects of 
two of the most important mi 11 tary commitments ever under-
taken by Great Powers: the United States in Vietnam and the 
Soviet Union in Egypt. These commitments are important be-
cause in recent years they have become active comrnitmenu which 
have had to have been fulfilled. As such, they have existed 
in the two most unstable regions in the world which are the 
greatest threats to_ world peace. Consider, first, some of 
the more salient points of the US involvement 1 in Vietnam. 
18 
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The documents and articles which have been published in 
recent years pertaining to the involvement of the United States 
in Vietnam have amply shown the connection between the per-
ceived need to fulfill U.S. obligations to the defense of the 
region and the need to maintain the credibility of all U.S. 
commitments. Vietnam, in short, became a test case for the 
actual res()ive of the United States in its promise to fulfill 
all of its obligations. 
Even before the United States began to become involved in 
the defense of South Vietnam, {even before there was a South 
Vietnam), the United States formulated its policies towards 
Indochina more on the basis of a coordination with its global 
interests than with respect to the factors inherent to the re-
. gion itself. It was with ·European considerations in mind, 
and especially the maintenance of friendly relations with France, 
that Franklin J. Roosevelt, the vociferous opponent of Euro-
pean colonialism, agreed to allow the French to re5ain con-
trol of Indochina. Roosevelt, with these objectives in mind 
during 1944 and 1945, shifted from his original plan for the 
region, the incorporation of Indochina into a U. N. Trustee-
ship. His successor, Truman, was even more preoccupied with 
the need to maintain close ties with his European alli ee. At 
the Potsdam. Conference of July 1945, Truman agreed to include 
Southern Indochina int.the Southeast Asian command of the Bri-
tish. The British openly helped the French return to the re-
gion and the United States and the Republic of China did no-
19 
1 thing to prevent the return. 
Even though U.S. objectives at this time for the region 
provided for the independence of the area, the implementation 
of this policy was hampered partly by this perceived need to 
maintain good relations with France. On September 27, 1948, 
a State Department Policy statement on Indochina noted: 
" ••• we have an immediate interest in main- . 
taining in power a friendly French govern-
ment, io assist in the further~nce of our 
aims in Europe. This immediate and vital 
interest has in consequence taken pr~ce-
dence over active steps toward the reali2 zation of our objectives in Indochina.." 
Hence, the original U.S. identification with the French in 
Indochina was predicat·ed upon the perceived need to pro-
tect stakes inherent in other commitments; in this case the 
strengthening of Western Europe which was beginning to be 
accomplishe:1 at this time. 
Also, during these years, the United States began to 
identif'y the struggle between the Vietmi.nh and the French in 
Indochina ae a symptom of the emerging differences between the 
Communist and non-Communist world. This was done despite the 
fact that considerable evidence indicated that there was no 
connection between Ho Chi 1~finh and the Soviet Union. In 
1948, the State Department's Office of Intelligence Research 
concluded that there was no evidence which supported the claim 
1 
Geoffrey Warner, "The United States and Vietnam. 1945-1965 Part 
!11945-54", International Affairs (London), Vol. 48, 
2 No. 3, ( July 1972}, PP• 380, 381. 
i bi d • , p • ~82 
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· that >foscow was directing a conspiracy in Southeast Aeia. 1 
However, such arguments were not accepted by the decision-
makers of the period. After the takeover of China by the Chi-
nese Communists, a dra~ National Security Council study no-
ted that: 
" •.. it is now clear that Southeast Asia 
is the target of a coordinated offensive 
directed by the Kremline o o o The extension 
of comm.uni st authority in China represents 
a serious political defeat fox> us; if South-
east Asia also is swept by communiem we shall 
have suffered a major political rout the re-
percussions of which will be felt throughout 
the worldp especially in the 1~iddle East ,nd 
in a then critically exposed Australia." 
The conclusions of this study were adopted as policy by the 
Truman administration shortly before the end of 1949. One 
of the conclusions af~irmed: 
11 The United States on its own initiative 
should now ••• scrutinize more closely the 
development of threats from Communist ag-
greesion9 direct or indirectp and be pre-
pared to help within our means to meet such 
threate by providing, economic and !1l.i li tary 
assistance and advice where clearly needed 
to supplement the resistance of other gov-
ernments in and ·out.··of the area which are 
rnor e direct ly cone erned. " ~ 
Thus, the United States motivation for the entire cornm:itment 
to Southeast Asia was to protect the region from any en-
1Geoffr,ey Warner, "The United States and Vietnam 1945-65 Part; 
II: 1954-65", International Affairs (London), Vol~ 48, 
No. 4, (October 1972), P• 612. 
2 Seoffrey Warner, op. cit., pp. ~8~, ~84. 
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croachment of'. Communiet expansion. On :4.ay 8,, 1950, the Truman 
administration announced that it was extending economic and 
military aid to France in Indochina. 1 
The basia of the U.S. involvement in Vietnam was founded 
upon the perceived need to resist the global expansion of Com-
munism. As such, the motivation for the United States involve-
ment was put on the same basis as its cororoi tments in Europe 
and elsewhere throughout the world. During the course of the 
1950's, the United States furthered its identification with 
the non-Communist forces in Vietnam:fiist with the French and, 
later, after the partition of Vietnam, with the South Vietnam-
ese government of Diem. In the meantime, the United States had 
undertaken an explicit commitment to the defense of the region 
through the establishment of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organi-
zation. Significantly, the U.S. role in the fulfillment of 
this treaty was limited only to the countering of aggression 
from Communist states. 
By the beginning of the 1960's, then, the United States 
has a firm stake in Southeast Asia in the prevention of Com-
munist influence from taking over the region. As the acti-
vities of the Viet Cong increased, strengthened and assisted 
by North Vietnam, it became necessary for some action to be 
taken in order to protect the independence of South Vietnam. 
The ability of the South Vietnamese government to cope with 
1 1 bid • , P • ,a5 . 
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the insurgent forces on its territory was made increasingly 
difficult as a result of not only the intensification of guer-
rilla activity, but also by the increasing instability of the 
South Vietnamese government. The ouster of Diem in Novem-
ber 196, brought about an unprecedented period of political 
instability to South Vietnam. The question, then, was raised -
Will the United States come to the assistance of the South 
Vietnamese government in the fulfillment of its security com-
mitment? 
The fact that the United States was motivated to ful-
fill its commitment to South Vietnam.in an effort to maintain 
the credibility of all of the United States' commitments can 
be demonstrated by an examination of statements by decision-
makers in Washington in the 1960 'e. Secretary of Jefense Rob-
ert S. :·.1acNamara noted in .·4arch 1964 that, although the loss 
of South Vietnam to the Communists would have resulted in 
"disagreeable consequencesn for the United States even if the 
United States had not been cornmitted to the security of the· 
country; the very fact that they were CO:'limitted would make 
these results even more disagreeable. 
"All of these consequences would probably 
have been true even if the U.S. had not since 
1954, and especially since 1961, become so 
heavily engaged in South Vietnam!) However, 
that fact accentuates the impact of a Com-
munist South Vietnam not only in Asia 9 but 
in the rest of the world~ where the South 
Vietnam conflict is regarded as a test 
case of U.S. capacity to help a na1ion meet 
a Cormnunist 'war of liberation'. 0 
1Geoffrey Warner, op. cit., p. 605. 
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The United States, then, was very dee.ply coaFnitted to 
South Vietnam by the middle of the 1960' s before the escala-
tion of the war in the Johnson administration. The United 
States has traced the letter of this commitment to Eisen-
hower• a pledge in 1954 to "assist the Government of Vietnam 
in developing and maintain(ing) a strong viable state, capa-
ble of resisting attempted subversion or aggression through 
military means. u The commitment was further extended by SEATO 
(t1collective self-defense against armed attack") and by Presi-
dent Kennedy in 1961 when he sent !ni.litary advisors to South 
' 1 
Vietnam. 
All throughout the 1960' s, the United States justified· 
the continuing coete of its· fulfillment of the security· com.nit-
ment to South Vietnam by asserting that such costs were necee-
sary to maintain the credibility of all of the U.S. commit-
ments. >1any quotes could be included here to substantiate 
this claim, but one particulr quote summarizes this· concept 
beet. Secretary of State Dean Rusk, in an interview on Aug-
ust 9, 1965, asserted the fol lowing: 
1 
.,. 
"The fact is that we know we have a commit-
ment. The South Vietnamese know we have a 
commitmento The Communist world knows we 
have a commitment. The rest of the world 
knows ito 
"Now 9 this means that the integrity of 
the American cornroi tment is at the heart of 
this pro·blem. I believe the integrity of 
(§) r · .. 
The Senator Gravel Edition. The Pentagon Papers, (Beacon 
Press, Boston. 1971), p.~o. 
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. " 
the .American comroi tnent is the principal 
structure of peace throughout the world. 
We have 42 allieso Those alliances were 
approved by overwhelming votes of our Sen-
ate. We didn»t go :in to those alliances 
through some sense of amiability or through 
some phi 1anthropic attitude toward other 
nationso ,~e went into them because we con-
sider these alliances utterly essential for 
the security of our own nationo 
"Now if our allies or, more particularly, 
if our adversaries should discover that the 
American corn..'lli.tment is not worth anything, 
then the world would face dangers of which 
we have not yet dreamed., And so it is irn-
portant for us to make good on thaI Ameri-
can com.mi tment to South Vi etnan1." 
Here, then, is full recognition on the part of the ~erican 
leadership, as they decided to expand the costs of the commit-
ment to South 1fietnam, that they were so doing in order to 
,.· 
maintain the credibility of all of the comrnitments of the 
United States as viewed by both their allies and adversaries. 
In a somewhat similar manner, the Soviet Union was forced 
in the 1960's and early 1970 1 s to significantly enhance their , 
involvement in the defense of Egypt. The various problems of 
commitment credibility which emerged in this situation is dis-
cussed in detai 1 in another study by this writer. 2 Only a 
v.ery brief eumr.nary of the major findings of that study need 
be mentioned here. 
By 1967, the Soviet Union had established a considerable· 
stake in Egypt. Since the arms deal of 1955, the Soviet Un-
1ibid., p. 6~. 
2 Robert c. Korte, "The Soviet Commitment to Egypt:- A Caee 
Study in Commitment Credibility," Unpublished I.R.471 
Readings paper, Lehigh University, Jecember 1972. 
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ion had expended vast sums of money in both military and eco-
nomic aid to bolster the non-,f/estern regime of Nasser. In re-
turn, the Soviet Union had not only gained considerable pres-
tige in the Arab world, they had also received considerable 
inroads into the Egyptian naval port facilities on the West-
ern controlled . .'fedi terranean Sea. 
The June 1967 War with Israel shattered the defensive 
capabilities of the Egyptians. Because the Soviets had been 
unwilling in actively supporting the Egyptians against the 
onslought of the Israelis, a considerable crisis in the So~ 
viet Unionfs crejibility to fulfill its cornmitm.ents to Egypt 
emerged. The Soviet Union was faced with a decision. The 
Soviets had either to restore the credibility of their defen-
sive co:rr:_rri tment to Egypt, or suffer the consequent loss 0£ 
Soviet prestige in the ,.fi..dJ.le East as well as its existing 
stakes. 
The Soviet.a chose to restore the credibility ·of their 
co_!.ami tment · despite increased costs. 1.11 thin the period of 
-O:ne year, all of the- Egyptian materiel lost in the war had 
been replaced. In addition, the weapons arriving in Egypt 
after the 1967 \~ar were qualitatively superior to the weapons 
the Egyptians had been using. The number of Soviet ffiilitary 
advisors ·in Egypt increased tenfold after the war and they 
were placed in a wider role of activities, sometimes along 
the front lines against Israel. This Soviet policy did re-
store Egyptian confiience in the Soviet defensive pledge, at 
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least until the outbreak of the"War of Attritionu. 
The 1.'1ar of Attrition began on January 25, 1969 when Egyp-
tian artillery fired upon two Israeli gunboats. In the months 
following, reprisal raids were launched by either side -across 
the Suez Canal. By the end of 1969, the Israeli raids haci 
been intensified to such an extent that Egyptian targets were 
being bombed by Israeli aircraft deep within the territory 
of Sgypt. The ability of Egypt to defend itself was obviously 
in doubt and, once again, the credibility of the Soviet pledge 
to defend Egypt was put to test. 
Again, the Soviets reacted to strengthen the defensive 
capabilities of the Egyptians. Again, the cost. was signifi-
cant. The ~ost modern of Soviet anti-aircraft weaponry was 
placed at Egypt's disposal, including SA.-,1-; 's, S~~6' s, modi-
fied MIG-21' s specially designed to fly at low altitude, and 
even Z([G-2~'s. The latter is, perhaps, the most advanced super-
sonic jet fighter ever constructed with a cotabat range double 
that of any other Soviet fighter and capable of achieving 
speeds in excess of 2,500 miles per hour. Soviet personnel 
also had to be sent in larger quantities in order to , super-
vise and maintain the highly sophisticated :nateriel. ~"1any 
surface-to-air rnissi les placed along the Suez Canal were em-
placed despite constant bombing of the sites by the Israelis. 
As a result of such action, the Soviets lost over 160 men 
killed by the Israelis. 
The fact was, though, the Soviets did decide to increase 
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their involve~ent in the defense of Egypt in an effort to 
maintain the credibility of their security comr.n.tment. Such ac-
tion not only protected Soviet prestige in the ,,Iiddle East (at 
least, unti 1 the next crisis), i_t protected the existing So-
vi et stakes in the region. In addition, the granting of any 
aseistance to the Egyptians on a quid pro quo basis served to 
further enhance the value of the Soviet presence in the re-
gion. By coming to Egypt's assi~tance in these crises, .the. 
Soviet Uni·on attained L1ore access to Egyptian ports and air-
fields, and therefore was able to increase its activities 
against the U.S. Sixth Fleet in the :.fediterranean. 
The t.r1aintenance of the credibility of a comr.a.i tment does, 
indeed, motivate Great Powers in their behavior in the inter-
national system. If this motivation is so influential, are 
there certain patterns of behavior which then follow? What 
factors deterrnine the evaluation of co~~:it:nent credibility in 
the minds of decision-makers of Great ?owers? How will the 
evaluation of co:nn:itrnent credibilty detera1ine a Power's re-
eponse in any given crisis? To more fnlly understand and 
identify the concepts inherent in these questions is the chal-
lenge of this thesis. 
). 
THE PROBABIUTIES OF co~~~T~·4ENT FULFILL./JENT 
----------
From the· evidence den:onstrated in the previous chap,.ter 
the ~ollowing hypothesis is offered: Great ?owers will always 
seek to ~aximi z e the credi bi li·ty of their commi t~r..ents. 
But what is this maxi:nu~ point of co~mnitment credibility 
in any given exigency? !re there certain 1iini ts here and, 
if so, where are they'! 
In an atter~pt to approach the answers to these questions, 
thls thesis shall analyse the risks which are undertaken by 
Great Powers as they seek to :naintain the credibility of their 
co:n:!lit~ents. If certain prohibitive points of risk are seen 
to result from certain policies e~nployed by Great ?owers in 
an ef~ort to maintain their com:~riitrnent credibility, then it 
is apparent that there are lirni ts upon Great Power behavior. 
In analysing risk, this thesis shall return to its ori-
ginal definition of risk-taking and employ those criteria 
which are evaluated by decision-makers in their esti~t1ation 
of risks inherent in protecting a co:ni:ii t1nent. The first 
such criterion was put in the forrrr of the following question: 
What is the probability that the guarantor state will fulfill 
its obligation to defend a client state should a threat to 
that client state arise? If it is wi:iely observed that a 
Great Power will be very likely to come to the support of a 
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client state, the co~iitrient credibility of that Great Power 
has been :rraximized. If there is cause for doubt, the credi-
bility of the corn~nit11ent will not be as strong. 
Logically, the probability that a Great Power willful-
fill a security co1nrnitment to a client state must depend on 
capability of the Power to effectively protect the territory 
as well as its motivation to do so. If the Power is able but 
unwilling to co1IJ.e to the defense of a client state, it clearly 
will not because it is not properly !notivated. In the sa-ne 
way, if the Power is willing to assist in preserving the de-
fense of' ··a country, but cannot, no action will be forthcoming. 
Both factors must be present if a defensive com~it~ent is to 
be believed. 
After making such an observation, it is necessary to return 
to this original criterion and ask the following: What is the 
source of the threat to the client state? 
This question is not academic, it is extrenely important. 
In the context of this thesis, the threat must corne fro~n either 
the rival of the Great ?ower or a rival of the client state. 
Both will affect the capability and motivation of the guarantor 
state in different manners. 
Consider, first, that the threat to the client state e:nin-
ates frorn the rival of the Great Power; i.e., a Great Power 
- -
itself. Then, under the assul.aptions of this thesis a deter-
rent relationship exists. What, then, is the capability of 
the guarantor state to effectively protect the territorial 
.. ,.i•. 
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integrity of the client state? 
It would be te;-~pting to i~n:j_e·::iately construct a relative 
scale of strength '"hich would effectively de~onstrate the co21.-
,• 
narative ·1ilitary capabilities of' both Great Powers. Such a 
scale would take into account the balance of nuclear weaponry 
which exists between the two ?owers as well as· a considera-
tion o:r the conventional rnilitary capabilities possessed by 
the two nations throughout the world. 
Certainly, the recognition of these factors is i:nportant 
in evaluating the relative capabilities of the 'two Powers to 
·effectively protect their co:nrni tr!lents. A ?ower would~ be, of 
course, better able to protect the territorial integrity o~ 
a client state if it possessed considerable conventional 
strength around it. .And if one Great ?ower were to possess 
a slight edge in nuclear strength, it ,nay be nore capable of 
protecting a region than the other. 
However, regardless of these considerations, both Powers, 
by definition do possess the capability to totally destroy the 
other, even if it is forced to retaliate in a second strike. 
A deterrent is effectively operating between these two Great 
Powers. The above factors are i::1:portant, but because they 
are both able to guarantee the destruction of the other, the 
relative capabi li ti es by Great ?owers to protect a defensive 
com·'Tlitreent vis-a-vis the other ?ower entails different con-
-- - --
· siderations. 
This thesis suggests, then, the existence of a" law of 
'" i:nposition" which, by itself, will maxi::nize·the capability o~ 
a Power to protect a-territory from the encroach:nent of another 
Power. This "law" (actually, only a hypothesis) asserts that 
the Power which places its military presence in a territory 
first excludes the other Power fro~ placing its ·11i li tary pre-
sence on the same territory. 
This law is not a creation of this thesis as this writer 
has, upon occasion, come into contact with studies which have, 
at least, asewned the presence of such a principle •. It is 
the effect of this law upon the maximization of a Power's 
corn:1itrnent credibility with respect to the other Power that this 
wishes to assert. 
First, the validity of this hypothesis. This law is ~nere-
ly a recognition of established behaviox.- patterns of Great Po-
wers which must forrnulate policy on the basis of an operative 
deterrent. At no time since the Second 1l/orld v,far have Soviet 
troops atternpted to dislodge Arnerican troops :rrorn a territory 
to which the United States was co~n.tted. Sirnilarly, the 
United States has never actively used its forces to "roll-
backu the Soviet r!li li tary fro:n Savi et held positions. This 
law does not apply to the high seas as the high seas are usu-
ally not consic.ered to be territory which is to be protected. 
Simply because the United States has ships, for example, in 
the l~edi terranean does not exclude the Soviets from introdu-
cing their naval vessels to the region. These vessels, how-
ever, as long as the deterrent r~ains operative, will not fire 
. ,u·pon each other. 
If the basis, then, of this law can be accepted·, this the-
sis asserts the :following. If the guarantor state has a firI 
military presence in a client state, the rival ?ower will be 
effectively deterred frori attacking that client state. Such a 
presence, therefore, ~aintains the credibility of the guaran-
tor's co:.rFrd tnent to protect the client st ate as long as the 
only threat to the client state is the actual er.a.ployment of 
military strength on its territory by the rival Power. How 
much of a military presence is necessary to effectively deter 
·the rival state? Enough of a presence so that its destruction 
by the rival state would significantly threaten the existence 
of the deterrent. 
Therefore, for a Great Power to maximize its corn.mi truent 
credibility in such cases, that Power should maintain its capa-
it.J.. '\O 
bilities which enable ft~destroy the other Great ?ower in a 
second-strike and it should continue ;:rl.aintaiJil~ufficient mi.Ii:~. 
tary presence in its client states. 
The ·11otivation of Great Powers to protect client states 
against threats from the rival Power is deterrnined by the 
perceived value of' the stakes involved. It follows logical-
ly that if the value of a stake is high, there is greater moti-
vation to protect it than if the value of the object to be pro-
tected is co~paratively worthless. 
The value of stakes has been classified into the follow-
categori es: marginal stakes; landslide stakes; and survival 
stakes. In this interpretation of the value of stakes, the 
basic deter:-ninant of value is the effect the loss 0£ a stake 
would have on a ?ower's relative standing in the hierarchy of 
. . 1 
11ations. In terms of a Great ?ower rivalry, then, the value 
of a stake is deter~:iined by how ~uch the loss of that stake 
J!rorr.. one ?ower to another \vould affect t-heir :.n.i li tary,. strength 
:6r p-olitical prestige in relation to each other • 
.A ~~arginal stake would have very little affect, one· way or 
the other, in being able to shift a ?ower • s place in any hier-
archy. A lan1s·.1td.e stake, hO\"lever, would have such an effect. 
The loss O'f a ':I-an:1s lid e stake by one Gr eat ?ow er to another 
Great Power would significantly alter the existing relation-
ship between the tl,,.,o states. A survival stake is even rnore 
i-tnportant as the loss of any such stake would eli:ninate a 
2 nation-state fro11 the internationa1 syste,;i. 
If two Great Powers a.re locked in a rivalry situation, anj 
if they have extended colll'.!:.itxents throug;h_ou-t the world to deny 
the introduction of the other nation 1-s p,owe:r to the areas, then 
the co;llmi t~:ients thernselves beco~ne stakes of, at least, land-
slide value as the lose of these commit1nents could result in 
the other Power gaining access to all of the resources and 
· territories which ·were previously under the control of the 
first Power. 
--
1 
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If it is perceived, then, to be vital to a ?ower's in-
terests to rnaintain coro:ni t:n.ents against its rival ( which is the· 
way Great 0 owers act), then it follows that not only are all 
its com:.1it:nents, at least, of landsliie value, each seperate 
oorrti t~nent is of the same value. 
This is a return to the principles inherent in the "indi-
visibility of co;:::d.tr:ients". These concepts especially apply· 
in situations of Great ?ower rivalry where the issue of deter-
rence is s,o, important in the protection of stakes. If one 
Great ?o~r.er were to believe that one st;k,,e held by the rival 
under the ter;~1s of a defensive :nilitary com~~:itment could be 
singled out and overtaken without a nuclear war, it c:ight be 
te~pted to· try. But as both Powers are interested in pre-
serving the deterrent, both Powers will consider each and every 
stake they maintain through a security co:n~:1it:~ent vis-a-vis 
-w 
the rival, as vitally in:.portant to their security. Each stake, 
each defensive CO}nm.it-rr.ent which is directly aimed at the rival 
?ower, is very itn!)g·rt·ant because if the other ?ower is temp-
ted to overtake it a direct clash could result. Such a strug-
gle would threaten the existence of the deterrent and could re-
sult in a nuclear war. 
What conclusions can, then, be offered concerning the prob~ 
ability that Great Powers will fulfill its obligations to a 
client state should a threat exist to that client state from 
the rival guarantor state? . 
All of the obligations a Great ?ewer has in 211aintaining 
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the security of a client state against the other Great ?ower 
will be xet if: l_. the guarantor state :-2aintains its strate-
gic and tactical capabilities at such a level to ensure the 
continuing existence of the deterrent relationship between it-
self and its rival; 2. the guarantor state x.aintains its :.1i li-
tary presence in the com.i:-,itted territory; and ;. the rivalry 
between the Great Powers continues in such a rnanner that the 
the guarantor state will consider the loss of the client _state 
as a serious threat to its own s.ecurity as it would involve 
the loss of other stakes an:i, poseibly a breakdown in the de-
terrent. If such factors exist, it is the assertion of this 
thesis that the guarantor state has Lnaxi121ized the credibility 
of its deterrent, and, hence, the credibility 0£ the coinmit·:nent. 
The above analysis see:11s to roughly describe the Great 
.Power relationship in Europe as it exists now and how it has 
existed in the years since w·orld i,~ar II. All of these factors 
have existed in recent years in the region and there seetns to 
~ be a great deal of respect between the United States and the 
Soviet Union concerning the credibility of their mutual com.nt-
menta. The Soviet Union has not overrun 1/lest Berlin even though 
they have for quite some time possessed the conventional capa-
bilities to d.o so. Similarly, in the 1950 1 s, the United States 
did not "roll-back" the Soviets in Eastern Europe, even when 
such crises as the Hungarian rev'olt in 1956 presented itself 
as an opportunity to do so. 
Current events and their re,sulting affect on future af-
fairs in Europe may so;:jeday shed a:ore light on the factors no-
ted above and their respective roles in the u:aximization of 
• 
corn_:ii t:nent credibility in comrd. tn1ents between Great Powers. 
For example, as talvs are now under way for a mutual and bal-
anced troop withdrawal fror.2 Europe, the qualitative value of 
maintaining troops .on foreign soil may be more closely esti-
mated. And, in a question which is very important to Europe, 
as a growing detente e.rnerges between the United States· and 
the Soviet Union, as well as a more stable deterrent (if it 
can be achieved i~.the SALT talks), how will such factors af-
. ' 
feet the credibility of the U.S. coat11itment to defend Europe? 
This first oueetion concerning the probability that a 
Great ?o,,1er will fulfill its obligations to defend a client state 
must now be directed to those threats which 1:r1ay exist to a 
client state which do not e:ninate from a Great Power. 
For the purposes of this analysis, there are three possi-
ble sources from which such a threat could be directed against 
a client state: 1. a state(s) which is in no way connected 
to any sort of a cornm.i tment with a Gr eat ·?ower; 2. a st ate( s) 
which is in fact, in one way or another, linked with the 
guarantor state• s Great ?ewer rival through a defensive com-
mitrnent; and ~. another client state(s) of the original guar-
antor state. ( It wi 11 be assumed in the pages to follow that 
in ea.ch of these groups only one state is threatening the 
client state. This need not be the case, but in the con-
I. 
text of this analysis, what applies to a threat from one 
state in one group also applies -to two or :nore states in the 
s arne category. ) 
The first category is the simplest and raises the least· 
amoun.t of co!!iplicating factors. The nuclear and conventional 
rr:ight of the Great Power could be ernployed ( at least, theoreti-
cally) against the threatening state without any fear of a 
Great Power's retaliation. The inherent capability of a Great 
Power to protect a client state frorn. threats such as these is 
very great. 
The motivation to defend thie state would probably depend 
on whatever resources the client state possessed which are of 
value to the guarantor state. The chances that this stake, how-
ever, would be of landslide proportions are rather slirn as the 
loss of such a stake would in no way great,Iy add to the power 
of the guarantor's rival. 
Although this case which is a possibility which must be 
:nentioned, it should be hastily ajded that this threatening 
nation should be very ~otivated to seek a security co21mi t-
~ent fro1n a Great ?ower before challenging its rival state 
which is supported by the military rnight of its guarantor 
state. This first category would appear to be very unstable 
and could easily evolve into the situation inherent in the 
second category. It seems to be very rare that a state will 
threaten a client state of Great Power and have no -identifi-
cation whatsoever with the other Great Power. At any rate, 
~8 
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such a threat would be very weak as the defensive c,apabilities 
of the Great ?ower could be brought upon to pressure the s:nall 
power with little ·risk of retaliation. 
The second category is a rnuch 1~ore complicated problem. 
for the guarantor state. If the threatening state is suffi-
•' 
ciently identified with the Great Power's rival, there must 
be considerable restraint upon the guarantor state not to. launch 
a full sea.le attack upon the threatening st 8te • 
. Certainly, not a nuclear attack! Even i:r the stakes in-
volved in the rnaintenance of the client state's territorial in-
tegrity ·· .-~-. were of a landslide value, such a nuclear attack 
would risk the existence of the survival stakes of the guar-
antor state. No nation would risk its survival upon the pro-
tection of landslide stakes if such a risk is not necessary. 
In this case, it is not. 
Conventional capabilities assume great importance in this 
categ-ory. The threatening state is soinewhat protected by its 
i·~'.entification with the other Great Power. This identifi-
cation brings the nuclear deterrent to bear upon this situ-
ation. However, the threatening state is likely to threaten 
with conventional rnilitary capabilities, as these capabili-
ties are probably at its disposal. Protected, then, by the 
nuclear umbrella of its guarantor state, the threatening 
state will seek to perpetrate its will upon its rival, the 
client state. 
What will determine the probability that a Great Power 
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will fulfill its obligations to protect ite client state 
should such a threat arise? Consider, first, the factor of 
the ?ower' s capabi li ti es. 
As has been noted, conventional ~eans of strength will be 
employed by the threatening state. Therefore, the convention-
al capabilities of the Great ?ower will play an i·'.nportant role 
in deterrnining the ability of the guarant~or Power to fulfill 
its obligations. Naval and air power a.re influencial factors 
in bringing assistance in the fore-of supplies and materiel 
to the client state. Air and naval power will also !nake it 
easier for the guarantor state to inflict p u nishrnent upon 
the threatening state without upsetting the deterrent. Naval 
forces can attack positions within the nation's territory frorn 
off-shore positions and therefore 10 not have to cross any 
boundaries which may be guaranteed by a Great ?ower. Air 
power, likewise, does not have to remove e=nplacements of troops 
to be effective and can inflict ite darnage in a very ehort ti:ne. 
If the Great ?ower, then, has superiority in these fields 
at the time of the outbreak of the threat, it will have the 
ability bring its power to bear upon the region. If it cannot 
bring such power ·to bear in that portion of the world, its 
• 
capabilities will be diminished. 
Another factor, here, is the relative conventional forces 
of both the threatening state and the client state. If the 
client state i_s in position to deal fairly effectively with 
with the threat, there wi 11 be less of a need on the part of 
4o 
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the client state for assistance from the guarantor state. As 
the guarantor state, then, would only have to supply a small 
amount of assistance, its capability to do so must be greater 
that\ if the client state needed greater assistance. Not on-
ly, then will the co1nparative strengths of the threatening 
state and the guarantor state be determining factors, the 
relative forces of the threatening state and the client state 
will also determine the capability of a guarantor state to 
come to a client state's aid. 
Again, the :notivation of the guarantor state to come to 
the assistance of a client state depends on the values of the 
stakes involved. The 1·n1ivieibility of com:rd.tment should ap-
·ply in this situation as the guarantor state wi 11 consider 
the rival Great Power's identification with the threatening 
state to be a challenge to all of its com.:~1it21ents which have ·been 
extenied to protect territories from its rival. 
However, as has been pointed out the client state in this 
situation ie faced with survival stakes, the guarantor state 
with landslide stakes at best. i'4oreover, a mere comaitment 
of words even with a :ieJJonstrated capability to bring power 
to bear upon the region, may not be enough to deter a threat-
ening nation. If the threatening nation believes that air 
and naval power will not inflict unacceptable damage to it-
self (and it :may not if it is agriculturally oriented), and 
if its motivations to launch an attack on its rival are high 
enough, then it may well launch an attack upon the client 
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state. Such an attack, if successful will be waged on the 
territory of the client state, with the resulting losses acru-
ing to the side of the client state. In this event, the client 
state will never be in a totally secure situation and will 
seek to maximize the probability that the Great Power will in-
deed co~ne to its assistance if the threat of' attack ever be-
comes a reality. 
As the guarantor's pledge is contingent upon a threat to 
the client state, the client state will seek in every way pos-
sible to ensure that the pledge for assistance is extended as 
automatically as possible. Jn overt threat to the client state 
in the form of a conventional attack upon it will be iiluch :nore 
serious to the security of the client state if the ti!ne lag 
between the eruption of the threat and the fulfillment of the 
comrni tment i e great. The rnor e bin :ling the security com:ni t-
ment becomes the greater the security of the client state. In 
addition, the more binding the nature of the coz:tnit:nent becomes, 
the greater the chance that the threatening state will be deter-
red from any possible attack. 
The two n1oat effective ways to make a com.mi trnent more 
binding are, first, for the guarantor st ate to pledge i:::nrneji ate 
assistance to a client state in the event of a threat and, se-
condly, and more importantly, the stationing of troops on 
the client state's territory - especially where the threat is 
likely to erupt. 
Consider, for example, the United States security com:rrit-
ment to the Republic of l{orea. In Article III of the mutual 
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defense treaty signed by these two countries on October 1, 1953, 
the· t\iO nations pledged that "each party will act to meet the 
co:nrnon danger in accordance with its constitutional process es. rt 1 
For the United States, then, to participate in a declared war 
in Korea it would, legally, have to get ·Constitutional ap-
proval. Although Jeclare:i wars are beco11ing :nore an historical 
legend than present .:iay fact, the Republic of South Korea cer-
tainly ~!lust· realize that if United States reaction to a threat 
involving an attack upon South Korea depended on the pro-
c.edure of Congressional approval, i te security could be signi-
_fi-cantly eroied by the time U.S. assistance was forthcor.rrl.ng. 
Korea has, in the years since the treaty atte21pted to get 
the TJnited States to pledge assistance of a !llore im~nediate na-
ture, should a threat present itself to the territorial in-
tegrity of South Zorea. Throughout these years, then, the uni-
ted States has had to convince the S0uthi1 Koreans that the prob~. 
ability that the United States \vould indeed corne to their assis-
t3nce was high. The United States has done this by stressing 
that any time lag between the eruption of a threat and the ful-
fi llr~ent of the U.S. corn~a.i tment would be very short. The U.S. 
in a nu~nber of public pronouncerrrents on the subject has aserted. 
that the United States was ready and ieter~nined to 
1iiiis1V ar 
"render prowpt and effective assistance 
to :iefeat an arm.ed attack again~t the 
1
see Article III of the Treaty 
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Renublic of Xorea, in accordance with the 
.. ~tual lefe~se Treaty of 1954." 1 
The United States, then, haE had to reaffir~n both its capabili-
ties and ~"!lotivationsto fulfill the co~~t[nent by assuring the 
South Koreans that, although ConBti tutional. procedures would 
sti 11 apply, the response would, indeed, be "pro!npt u. 
To further create a sense of i:r..t:ediacy in the co..:n'.·9.i tr1ent, 
t:h·e United States has kept military troops in such countries 
-as South Korea which is threatened by a state closely iden-
' ,. tified with the rival of the United States. The protection 
of these troops is the responsibility of the ?resident of the 
United States in his role of fµlfilling his responsibilities 
.. granted to him _by the Consti:tutio;n. -Such policy, then, signi_-
:Cicantly enhances the feeling of· i:nmed.iacy inherent in the 
security treaty. A threat to South Korea will alr:ost sure-
ly necessitate a threat to United States forces in South Ko-
rea. Therefore, a reaction of the threat by the United States 
ie likely to be even rnore proe.1pt if U.S. troops are present 
in the country. In addition, the North Koreans are assured 
that any attack upon South l(orea would be ;nore likely to pro-
voke a U.S. response. As the United States has·" situated so21e 
- of their coinbat forces right on the border between North and 
2 South Korea at the ~8th par 9 llel i:p recent years, the prob-
ability that the U.S. would underta\'e its obligations to 
1 
. United States Security Agreements and Com'.ni tments Abroad, 
·-rco~-:u.ttee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 91st Congress), Vol. II, P• 15~7. 
2ibid., p. 152e 
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-.c::-ome. to the defense of the S.o.uth Koreans has been vety high. 
The probability, then, that a·Great ?ewer will ful:t'ill 
ite obligations to a client state in the event a threat to that 
state en:erges from another state, protected to soe1.e degree by 
a security comraJtffient by the.other Power, will be determined 
by the following factors: 1. th~ relative effectivenes8 of the 
guarantor state's conventional power in relation to the threat-
ening state; 2. the relative ability of the client state to 
protect its elf against the threatening state and the amount. of· 
assistance it needs; ;. the ra.oti vatioti. o.f ·the g.uarantor state 
to react to the threat as it should. ·recognize the inherent 
landslide va.1ue of the stake in the protection of the co::!1:ni t-
:rrent; and 4. the degree to which the Great· Power has irrevers-
ably bourid itself to the defenseof the territory in the event 
·~PY ·s:·uch threat should emerge. 
Finally, is the consideratio:n o:f :the third. po·ssible threat 
·to a client state - a threat whi.ch ea1inates from another client 
state of the same guarantor state. 
This is a very difficult eituatio·n £;pr the guarantor state. 
The entire purpose ·of its corn·nit.rnents to the two client states 
was to bolster their defensive capabilities against the ?ower' s 
chief rival. As such, the guarantor undertook specific pled-
ges to come to the assistance of either client state should· 
their territorial integrity be challenged by the rival.· Howi'ver, 
if both clie:mit states consider the other client state to be 
a threat to its territorial integrity,~y ":!lay approach the guar-
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antor state seek the fulfillment of its. security co1n~nitment·. 
';Vhat is the probability that the guarantor state will come to 
their assistance? 
In this particular example, a consideration of the guar-
antor's r.nilitary capabilities is of little value. Jespite its 
ability to do so, it would be utterly senseless for a guarantor 
state to become actively engaged in the fulfillment of a se-
curity pledge to client state A against client state B, while. 
at the same ti::ne fulfilling its t1ilitary defensive com::rd.trnents 
to client state B to defend it fro.11 client A. If a battle 
erupted and the guarantor state' e troops were present on both 
sides, the guarantor state would find itself in the ridicu-
lous situation of shooting his own troops by his own troops. 
This contingency will clearly want to be avoided by the guar-· 
antor state. 
The guarantor state ia very strongly motivated in such 
a circumstance to seek an afaelioration between the two client 
states. If a fight were to erupt between the two states, the 
stability of the region could significantly deteriorate which 
would increase the chances that the Great ?ower 1 s rival could 
take advantage of the situation. The Great Power, then, 
should try to negotiate a settleraent acceptable to both siies. 
In order, to further protect against an outbreak of hosti li-
ties, the guarantor Power would be likely to stress that it wi 11 not: 
support the agressor and would shut off arm supplies to the 
region in the event of an outbreak of hostilities. 
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_,I Such a policy would seek to protect the Great ?ower' s in-
terests in the region ae it would be an atte~pt to preserve the 
stability of the region so it could be rnore effectively pro-
tected against the rival Power. However, the iegree of the suc-
cess of this policy depends on several factors which are beyond 
the control of the guarantor state. 
First, ·;· 1r.-i!s the degree to which each of the client states 
consijered the other to be a threat to its security interest. 
Of particular importance in these evaluations by the client 
states would be which threat they considered to be greatest: 
the threat from the rival Great Power against whoru the client 
state's co··rtni tr1ent with the guarantor state is directed; or 
the threat from the rival client state. If the rival Power 
is the primary threat, then it would follow that the client 
state would value its identification with the guarantor state 
as a vital component of its security. In order to r:iaintain 
its primary security interests, then, the client state would 
be 1notivated to yield to the guarantor state's efforts to 
bring about a stability to the region. Certainly, if the 
guarantor state were to threaten that its original commit:nent 
to the client state would be abrograted if that state should 
perpetrate any aggression against its rival client state, that 
state would not attack its rival. 
If, however, both client states were to perceive the 
existence of the other state, or certain policies enacted by 
the other client state as being the primary threat to its se-
.. 
curity, then the guarantor state's pledge of non-support in 
the event of hostilities seriously jeopardizes its own securi- · 
ty. Barring the success of negotiations (which, of course· 
would be increasingly difficult in cases of nation-states which 
perceive each other's policies as being the primary threat to 
their security), the client states' identification with the 
guarantor Power becomes of little value. AS such, the guaran-
tor state is likely to lose whatever influence it once had 
over the two states. At this point, the relative conventional 
!nilitary strengths of the two client states would be likely 
to determine the outcol!le of this situation. 
Another factor would deter:rrine the degree of success the 
guarantor state's efforts at negotiation woald1bel_likely to pro-
duce. This factor would be how easily a client state could 
seek another commitment to protect it fro~ its rival. If both 
states were able to achieve co1nTa.tn1ents frorn other sources, 
the efforts by the guarantor state to introduce restraints on 
their actions would be futile indeed. 
Two case studies of two feuding client states protect'"ed 
by one guarantor state de-rnonstrate the influence. of the fac-
tors listed above on the success of the guarantor state to 
control events in the rivalry. As such, the probability 
that a guarantor state will fulfill its cominitment obliga-
tions to such client states is reflected upon.. These two 
case studies are the India-?aldetan rivalry and the Turkish-
Greek differences over Cyprus. 
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The United States has co~nritted itself to these four 
' countries either explicitly or implicitly. With regards to 
Turkey and Greece, the United States is com.::rl.tted to both of 
these states through NATO. The United States also maintains 
additional co-,n:!lit,aents to Turkey through its association with 
CENTO and a 1959 mutual security treaty signed by both nations. 
The United States co:nmit~nent to Pakistan is embodied in SEATO, 
implied in its association with CENTO, and specifically out-
lined in another 195'9 11utual defense treaty. 
The United States commitment to the defense of India is 
not so explicitly defined given the neutralist role India has 
envisaged itself' to be playing since the Cold War. The Uni-
ted States has always been eager to enlist Indian support 
against Com··nuni st aggression on the sub-continent, but had to 
wait until the Sino-Indian bcbrder conflict of 1962, before it 
could undertake a major pledge to grant rni li tary assistance 
to India. On Dece:!lber 29, 1962, the United States and Brit-
ish leaders met at Nassau and deter.nined t.o send over 120 
million dollars worth of defensive equipment to India. By 
the miJile of the next year, the two powers had reaf:Cirmed 
their intensions by agreeing to grant :.nore military aid to 
India over and above the earlier Nassau decieion. 1 The Uni-
ted States, then, was identified with India's defense and 
had undertaken pledges to come to India's assistance, even 
1 
' :bhaTillllad Ayub Khan, Friends Not Aasters (London, 1967), pp. 134, 
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though there was never a formal alliance relationship. 
~ith _ _regards to a,11 four of these nations, then, the United 
States has been, to varying degrees, a guarantor state. In ad-
dition, the client states involved have been locked in rivalry 
situations with other client states. These case studies are 
pertinent, then, to this an8 lysis. 
Consider, first, the varying degrees of hostility which 
identify the two sets of rivalries. 
The history of the India-Pakistan .feud suggests a strug-
gle of very great proportion. Since the creation of the two 
states, these two countries were the moEt significant countries 
on the sub-continent. Furthermore, territorial disputes have 
prevented the two from existing in harmony with each other. 
The dispute over Kashcnir and Jamr:c.u is further intensified by 
the very deep religious differences which exist between them-
selves. The animosities which exist between these two states 
have erupted into war three times since their independence. 
The hostility which has existed between Pakistan and In-
dia has been very deep. Pakistan has always considered India 
to be the chief threat to her security as India is, by far 
the most powerful of the two as it has a larger population 
and industrial base. Furtherrnore, before 1971, Pakistan was 
presented with the very acute security probler.a. of maintain-
ing the territorial integrity of East Pakistan, which was 
separated fro~ West Pakistan by some 1000 miles of Indian 
territory. India, too, considered Pakistan to be its chief 
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threat. It is significant to note that even after the Sino-
Indian war in which the Chinese advanced at will against 
Indian poei tions along India's nothern frontier, the Indians 
·continued to ~aintain the bulk of their fighting force against 
Pakistani posi tionE along the Pakistani-Indian bor:.iers. The 
aiilitary build-up by India following the 1962 \iar was not ac-
co~panied by a redeploy~ent of Indian troops away frorn the 
Pakistani border. 1 
tNashington made it clear throughout the first half of 
the 19fO' s that it would not come to the assistance of either 
Pakistan or India if they should initiate a war against the 
other. However such assurances were not co1.aforting to the 
Pakistanis as they viewed their relative strength vis-~-vis 
India in the years since 1962 as rapidly deteriorating. •' 
Pakistan sought to get the United States to apply pressure on 
I India to settle its territorial -:.disputes with Pakistan as 
it felt that the United States would have so1ne influence over 
India after 1962 due to the increased shipments of r!1ilitary 
.. supplies. However, Washington probably hesitated to push 
the Indians too far because the U.S. did not want to j eopar-
dize its renewed efforts to thwart what it perceived to be a 
Comrnunist threat to the sub-continent. As such, ?aki st an 
·, · .... 
became increasingly disen~hanted with the United States 
and, after the U.S. imposed an arrns e.:nbargo on both Pakis-
1 Asia and the International Syste.JJ., Wilcox, Rose, Boyd 
t P• 110. 
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tan and India after the 19f5 1tlar, seriously curtailed its alli-
1 
ance relationshio with the United States. Even as early as 
one year after the· United States stepped up its aid to India 
and failed to apply enough pressure on India to settle in Kash-
rnir an~ Jarnmu as a result of this increase in U.S. involve-
ment, ?akistani President .Ayub Khan noted: 
"By this ti~e it was becorning clear to us 
that, in the event of India attacking us, it 
was most unlikely that the U.S.A. would ho-
nor its co~~itment and come to our assis-
tance. " 2 
Because neither India or Pakistan highly valued the k::leri-
can cor.r-d. tment to protect them from Conu.c.unist aggression in 
relation to the protection they sought against each other, 
American efforts in bringing a general restraint to the re-
gion were not effective. This fact was further reinforced by 
the relatively easy manner in which both Pakistan and India 
were able to find other sources of rnilitary assistance. 
Pakistan discovered an all too willing ally in the ?eople's 
Republic of Co:~:nunist China and improved its relations with Red 
China considerably during the 1960 1s. This was all part of 
Ay~b Khan's plan to find more regional solutions to his coun-
try' a s'ecurity problems. For the Chinese Co:nmunists, such a 
detente with Pakistan would not only work to diminish .Ameri-
can influence in Pakistan, it would strengthen Pakistan's 
position against India, a rival of China. In the tLeantir1e, 
1 
For a more con:plete account of U.S. Pakistani relations see 
Robert C. Korte's uThe U.S. Corr11nit1nent to Pakistan", Un-
2 published I.R. 471 paper, Lehig-h University, ",lay 1973. 
· ~·~ohammad Ayub Khan, Friends :Not <asters ( London, 1967), P• 153. 
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India founa·a weaoons supplier in the Soviet Union which was 
probably only too willing to supply arms to India when the 
United States had. chosen not to· as well as to counter any Chi-
nese influence in Pakistan. The entire resilllt of this si tua-
tion, as far as the Uni t,ed States was concerned was the com-
plete loss of any of its com,·tltment credibility to the re-
gion. In fact, by 1971, the United States comuiitment to 
Pakistan was effectively dead and Indian-U.S. · relations had 
su·ccumbed to a new low. The r·elative conventional strengths 
in the region played thernselves out in the 1971 1a~tar much to 
the loss of Pakistan and the United States. 
This case study shows that the guarantor state, in an 
effort to preserve its original goals for the region, was not 
willing to fulfill any co;mn_trnent it might have to co~e to the 
assistance of the one client state against the other. Be-
cause of the irreconcilable nature of the conflict, such a 
backing away from . a· pledge of assistance resulted in serious 
security problems for at least one of the client states, the 
weaker Pakistan. The United States found that it was impos-
sible to bolster the state of India for anti-Co1n:nunist pur-
poses without reducing the credibility of its corn.(ni t:nent vie-
a-vis Pakistan. Further efforts at restraint after the 1965 
-
11ar not only resulted in driving the Pakistanis into the 
ar~s of the Chinese, India was more inclined to seek closer 
:ni litary ties with tri:e Soviet Union. 
Turning briefly to the Turkish-Greek probl~~ over Cyprus, 
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the different factors ende:nic to this problerr: produced responses 
by the guarantor st ate. 
The fundarnental issue which has existed between Turkey 
and Greece has centered around the status of the island of' ·Cy-
prus where roughly four-fifths of the inhabitants are of Greek 
descent, one-fifth of Turkish origin. The problem could be 
traced all the way back to 1821 when the Greek revolt against 
the Turks resulted in a Greecian nation-state. However, in 
the context of this analysis, it is sufficient to begin at 
the Zurich settle!nent of 1959. 
This accord provided for the independence of Cyprus fro:n 
Bri tieh don1ination with the exception of certain military ba-
ses which would be rnaintained by Great Britain. This was 
considered to be a corapro:nise between enosi! (the-v.nifica-
tion of Cyprus with Greece), and a Turkish control of the is-
land. Greece and Turkey were permitted to station small ar-
rdes on Cyprus to protect their own interests in the region. 
In addition a 7-3 Greek Cypriot, Turkish Cypriot ratio,; was 
established in the administrative govern.:ent of the new coun-
1 try. 
Problems obviously developed from such a settlement and 
fighting broke out between Greek and Turkish forces late in 
1963 .after the Turks considered the safe~yi of their popula-
tion to have been threatened by the Greek Cypriot Govermient. 
The Greek Cypriots were stronger than the Turkish Cypriots, 
1 
Peter Calvocoressi, International Politics Since 1945, (New 
York, 1968), p. 206 
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but the nation of Turkey was significantly :nore powerful than 
Greece. Therefore, in order for Turkey to bring its power to 
bear upon Cyprus, it would have to transport considerable mili-
tary power from the mainland of Turkey to the island of Cyprus • 
In 1964, the Turks threatened to carry out such an invasion 
upon Cyprus in order to enforce their will on the island. The 
United States, com:nitted to both Greece and Turkey in NATO had 
a clear interest in avoiding such hostilities and placed its 
naval power of the Sixth Fleet between the island of Cyprus 
and Turkey in such a way as to effectively deter· a Turkish in-
vasion. In the meanti1ne, the United States sought a diplo1na-
tic solution to the crisis but could not reach a formula which 
l was acceptable to the parties involved. 
It is quite evident that although this dispute between Tur-
key and Cyprus was a very difficult problem and there were 
very strong emotional issues on each side, Turkey was not the 
primary threat to Greece in 1964 and Greece was not the primary 
threat to Turkey. This role was clearly reserved for the So-
viet Union. Th"e magnitude and proximity of the Soviet Union 
was a direct security threat to these two countries. As such, 
both Turkey and Greece must have realized that the continuing 
commitment by the United States their territories was of the 
utmost concern to themselves. 
The fact that Turkey was si·gnificant ly deterred from at-
tacking Cyprus because it recognized tlµs dependence upon the 
1
·b·d 1 l •, PP• 208, 209. 
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United States is clearly de:nonstrated by exa1nining a letter 
sent to Prime ~\.finister Inonu of Tu.rkey by President Iqndon 
B. Johnson after it was apparent that Turkey was considering 
an attack upon Cyprus. ?resident Johnson, in no uncertain 
language warned Inonu that a Turkish attack upon Cyprus could 
possibly result in the unwillingness of the United States, 
through the N.~TO treaty, to fulfill its obligations to the de-
fense of Turkey. Johnson wrote on June 5, 1964: 
"Adhesion to NATO, in its very essence, 
means that NATO countries will not wage 
war on each other. Gere1any and France 
have buried cent uri es of anirno si ty and 
hostility in becoming N.ATO allies; nothing 
less can be expected from Greece and Tur-
key. Furtherrnore, a military intervention 
in Cyprus by Turkey could lead to a direct 
involvement by the Soviet Union. I hope 
you wi 11 understand that your NATO allies 
have not had a chance to consider whet her 
they have an obligation to protect Turkey 
against the Soviet Union if Turkey takes 
a step which results in Soviet interven-
tion without the full consent 1 and under-standing of its N.ATO allies. u 
Inonu finally did back down from his threat to invade 
Cyprus priinari ly because of the U.S. unwillingness to support 
his 1 2 p ans. Inonu clearly valued the U.S. com.rnitment to pro-
tect Turkey fro 1n the Soviet Union as an irreplaceable asset to 
Turkey's vital security. No other country could effectively 
protect either Turkey or Greece as the United States could. 
The Turks still recall the United States actions in this 
1
United States Security Agreements and Com"litments Abroad, op. 
cit • , p. 1849. -
2 
ibid., p. 18~4. 56. 
crisis in blocking attempts by Turkey to invade Cyprus "as blunt, 
maladroit and, as a retreat from the obligation of one ally to 
1 
another." .. As a result, Turkish and A!lerican relations have 
soured in recent years and the Turks have even sought to base 
their relations with the Soviet Union on a ~nore ainicable foun-
dation. However, Turkey is still a ;nernber of NATO and, as 
such, the .American comrait~ent to the territorial integrity of 
the region ret~ains. 
In this case study, then, the United States again sought 
not to become involved in supporting either side in a struggle 
which involved two of its client state. It sought to maximize 
the stability of the region by negotiations and the p lacernent 
of actual restraints upon the military forces of the client 
states. Its e:t'forts did rnaintain the spirit of the original 
co:nmitment beco.\lse its efforts were very influential upon the 
client states. This was, at least, partially the result of1 the 
perceived need by Greece and Turkey to maintain a coG1C1i trnent 
relationship with the United States and also the result that 
neither state's security interests would be enhanced by the 
extension of another Po~s co21:·nit1nent to their respective 
t erri tori es. 
This chapter has attempted to more closely determine the 
probability. of a Great Power's response in fulfilling a com1njt-
ment to a client state should a threat suddenly ernerge .to that 
·, 
1 
ibid., p. 1854. 
client state. Thie thesis concludes the following. 
Case# l: The obligation by a Great Power to fulfi 11 a 
defensive co·.:n~tment to a client state against a threat from 
the other Great Power. 
The probability that a Great Power would act to fulfill 
this commitm.ent is very high. Given the deterrent relation-
ship, each Great ?ower wi 11 have the capability to protect its 
cli.ent states from an overt attack by the other Great Power if 
it merely maintains a significant m litary presence in the cli-
ent states. Further1nore, both Great Powers will be highly lnO-
tivated to protect these states from falling into the hands 
of' the other because they are both in a rival situation. In 
addition, if one client state was lost to the rival Power be-
cause the guarantor state did not fulfill its commitments, the 
credibility of its other co:u.vnitment would be significantly 
depreciated. This would have a serious destabilizing affect on 
the deterrent relationship. Each Great Power, then, is both 
able and willing to protect its client states from an attack 
from the rival ?ower. 
Case# 2: The obligation by a Great Power to fulfi 11 a 
a defensive co~mitrnent to a client state against a threat 
from a third state not under any sort of direct or indirect 
co:nmitment by a Great Power. 
The probability that a Power would react to fulfill such 
a co;nmitment is, also very high. The overwhel.Ining capability 
of the Great Power and the client state against this third 
... 1,r-J 
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state coupled with the value of whatever stakes· exist in the 
client state should r·esult in a Great ?ower response to fulfi 11 
the c O!:i.2U tm ent • 
Case # J: The obligation by a Great Power to fulfi 11 a 
defensive co:r..mt:1ent to a client state ·against a threat fro1:1 
' a third state which is a client state of the other Great Power. 
Here the probability of a Great Power's response depends 
on a number of factors; factors which vary frorn case to case. 
Such factors include: the relative conventional capabili-
. ti es as they apply to the region of the threatening state, the 
t·i,;-
client state and the guarantor state; the nature of the co:n.llit-
nent by the rival Power to the threatening state; the degree 
to which the guarantor state would co.nsider the fulfillment 
of its co:nmitment as a protection of a landslide stake; and 
the degree.to which a threat to the client state i.ci.:nediately 
presents itself as a threat to the guarantor state. 
Case # 4: The obligation by a Great Power to fulfill a 
defensive coI11U.t.rnent to a client state against a threat from 
another client state o~ the seJne Great Power. 
A Great Po,1er is likely not to fulfi 11 such a coru::rl t-
ment. It is not motivated to do so because the original pur-
pose of the co?-a.mi tments is likely to have been directed against 
the rival of the Great Power. For a Great Power to beco1ne in-
volved in a war bet,.,e.en these two client states which would 
subsequently under~ne the stability of the region would be 
of little value to the Great ?ower. 
59 
RISK-TAKI!iG !L'ID CO).f.4ITi,JENT CREDIBIUTY 
The prececeding chapter analysed a very important factor 
in the evaluation of risks which must be undertaken by a Great 
Power in the fulfillment of any particular defensive co.%~t-
11ent. However, this was only one factor out of four which is 
e<nployed by decieion-~'Ilakers to deter·nine risks and, as such, 
this analysis is still inco11plete. Thie chapter shall exa'.nine 
the other factors of risk-taking in an effort to co=nplete the 
goals undertaken by the previous chapter. 
First, it should be recalled that the other criteria uti-
lized by decision-makers in evaluating risks are: What will 
be lost or gained if the ?ower yields the stake without a fight? 
lr/hat will be lost or gained if the Power loses the stake with 
a fight? \'{hat wi 11 be lost or gained if the Power holds the 
stake with a fight? 
The basic concept which is introduced to this analysis 
through the consideration of these questions is the concept of 
"cost". A cost shall be defined by this writer as the ainount 
of money, lives, materi.el and effort which is e·!nployed by a 
state in an endeavor to achieve a certain policy objective. 
A "fight", then, is a co&t of a. certain magnitude and the pro-
~ection of. any stake must entail some cost by the guarantor 
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st.ate. 
This thesis shall now apply the consideration of these 
concepts to the cases discussed in ~he previous chapter. Con-
sider, first, Case # 1, in which a Great ?ower is co~i tted - . 
to protect a client state from a direct threat froCT the other 
Great Power. 
What will be lost :or· :g;a.ined if the Power yields the stake 
without a fight? 
Here the Great Power is a-nploying zero costs in the protec-
tion of its stakes and, as a result, its losses will be very 
considerable. The Great Power will lose whatever resources 
and stakes existed in the client state to the rival Power. This 
would add power to the rival Power and diminish the strength 
o.f the guarantor Power. In addition, the guarantor s~ate would _llose 
a great degree of its credibility to fulfill its obligations 
of its other com:rritments which have been directed against the 
rival Power. Such loss of credibility would seriously under-
mine the security of these states and, as a result, jeopardize 
the security of the Great ?ower. In such a ei tuation, the ri-
val Power could be ternpted to test the validity ofthese co.nmj t-
mente and, as a result, the entire deterrent relationship would 
be lost. 
Nothing would be gained except the expenditure of those 
costs which could have been en1ployed by the Great Power to 
protect the client state without a fight. In this case, these 
costs would not be significant. It has already been demonstra-
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ted by this thesis that a Great Power in this situation could 
maintain a high probability that it would, indeed, come to the 
fulfillment of its obligations to protect the client state against 
the rival Power with a m ni ::1um of effort. A :ni lit ary pr es ence 
in the region as well as the continued maintenance of the nuclear 
deterrent would be sufficient to guarantee the credibility of 
its co:~ tr.1ents in this case. lt{hen cornpared to the overwhelm-
ing losses which would be incurred by the Great Power if it 
did not employ these costs, the value of the costs are well 
worth their return. 
The expenditure of zero costs, then, by a Great Power in 
this situation, will result in very great risks to its own se-
curity as weil as to the security of its client states. Vvith 
a relatively sr.1all a'°~ount of cost, the degree of risk inherent 
in its protection of these client states is substantially re-
duced. A relatively small arnount of cost by both Great Po-
wers wi 11 preserve the deterrent which wi 11 preserve the credi-
. bility of their co:.mnit:!lents to protect client states from the 
other Power. 
What will be lo.st or gained if the Power loses the stake 
I. 
with a fi g ht ? 1 
First, it should be noted that a fight between the two Great 
Power significantly underrnines the deterrent· relationship. 
:ls the Great Powers have a vested interest in maintaining this 
deterrence, any such fight would result in serious losses to 
both sides; losses which could possibly escalate into their 
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mutual total destruction. 
-
As the deterrent has broken dol{n in such an exarnple, this 
particular case has now exceeded the lints of this thesis. This 
writer :-ierely notes that as both Powers will not deliberately 
engage in policies which would result in their destruction, both 
Powers will seek to avoid a fight. Certainly, if a threatening 
Power realizes that the committed Power will fight to protect 
a client state, no stake in that client state is worth the 
disruption of thejdeterrent. If both Powers, then, refrain fro;.n. 
an attack, a··fight will not occur. 
The third question, "What will be lost or gained if the ?o-
wer holds the stake with a fight?~, likewise exceeds the assuinp-
tions of this thesis. It seems to be clear, however, that if 
the deterrent is substantially disrupted in such a fight, it 
really :nakes no difference if the etake in a client state is 
preserved or not. If the guarantor state, itself, is destroy-
ed, stakes in the defense of client states have no,10re relevancy. 
\-that can be concluded frorn this analysis of risk-taking . 
in this particular case? 
Thie thesis asserts that a Great Power's comrnitment credi-
bility can be maximized at a low coat, at a low level of risk. 
The Great ?ower need merely maintain a military presence in 
a client state and maintain its deterrent relationship with 
the rival Great Power in order to maximize the security of 
the c li ent st ate. 
Case# 2 deserves only the superficial attention of this , 
_) 
I 
thesis as its peculiar properties seem to rarely,ma.nifest them-
selves in the real world. 
The Power would lose the following if it yielded its etakes 
in the client state without a fight: the credibility of its com-
mitments to defend such states; and the value of whatever stakes 
existed in the country. It would gain the value of the costs 
which it would have taken to preserve the defense of the cli ant 
_state. 
If the Power lost i te stakes in the state with a fight, 
the Power would have lost all of the factors noted above inclu-
ding the costs which were e:nployed to try to preserve the stake. 
If the Power ·maintained its stakes after a fight it would 
retain the·value of these stakes and preserve the credibility 
of its si1ni lar comini tments at the loss of whatever cost was 
expended to protect the state. 
It should be rernernbered that in this particular case, the 
Great Power and the client state possessed significantly 11ore 
military power than the threatening third state. It would fol-
low, then, that the guarantor state could fight to protect the 
client state at little loss to itself. The guarantor state, 
therefore, would be likely to assess the value of the stakes 
in this client state as being justified by the cost of pro-
tection. 
Because of this overwhelrning preponderance of power, then, 
the credibility of the Great ?ower's commit1nent to the client 
··-
st a. t e can be maxim.zed at a very low level of risk. The Great 
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Power can, in fact, enforce the def'ense of the client state 
with an effective application of military strength which is 
certain to ov erwhel.21 the opponent. 
Skipping to Case# 4, it is evi·'.ient that if the guarantor 
state yields its defense obligation to one client state in al-
lowing another client st ate t.,,ov er run it without ernp loyi ng any 
effort to protect the state, it will lose all credibility of 
its comrni tment to that state. In ad::ition, by allowing such 
a de-stabali.zing situation to occur in the territory, the de-
fense of which against the rival Great Power is vital to the 
security of the guarantor state, serious losses to the eecuri ty 
of the Great ?ower would result. By doing nothing, the only 
cost the Great ?ower would save would be whatever efforts it 
could undertake to try to reach an accomod.ation between the 
two client states. There would be a limit to the a:nount of 
efforts which could be applied by the guarantor state in this 
particular etideator, as it would run the risk of alienating 
one of' the client states should the Power seek to impose too 
great a restraint on either of the client states which could 
seriously jeopardize their security. 
At this level, then, the Great Power will seek to employ 
costs in ar/effort to maintain its interests in the area. These 
costs will be below the level of a fight and may result in 
Great Power yielding the stakes in the region, then, without 
a fight. The factors which would deter:nine whether or not 
.; 
this would occur are beyond the control of the Great Power 
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and were discussed in the previous chapter. The end result 
will be, however, that the Great Power will lose ·nore than it 
gains if it,loees its stakes without a fight. It could very 
well lose its entire influence in the region. 
The next two questions pertain to an a.ctua.l fight by the 
guarantor state to preserve its stake in the region. As has 
been ,nentioned before, such a fight is unthinkable to a guar-
antor state regardless of whether its stake in the client state 
would be protected from a threat by another client state. Such 
a fight would tend to undermine the guarantor state's stakes in 
both states and could seriously weaken the position o"f~ ·the re-
gion with respect to the guarantor state's rival. 
A fight, then, by the Great ?ower, would not ~a:ximize its 
commitment credibility in the region. All co:r-nmjtment credi-
bility with respect to the client state,against whom the guar-
antor state's military activities were directed, would disappear. 
That client state would have nothing to lose, then, to seek a 
co21mt1nent from another guarantor state. Such a state could 
possibly be the Great Power I s rival. This conseouence would 
_. 
seriously under.mine the purpose of the original conimi tment, 
which could then result in very high risks for the Great Power. 
Such a reaction by the guarantor state, then, would be at a 
very high cost (a fight) and could result easily in very great 
risks for its interests in the area. 
The effort, therefore, by a guarantor ·state to prevent 
the eruption of' hostilities between the two client states is 
' ~ 
not only the best way to maintain that Power's commitment 
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credibility to the region, it is also a relatively low-cost 
policy with the greatest chances of producing lower risks to 
- . its own security interests in the region. The corTni tment cre11-
bi li ty of the guarantor state is maintained if the Great ?ower 
can successfully reinforce the value of the original comrnit-
ment upon the two client states. It may be able to do this 
by diplor1atic means or preventive military means either through.-
arms embargoes or effective blockading activities. These 
are usually not costly 1neasures and if they succeed, the re-
sulting stability in the region will lessen the risks that the 
Great Power will. lose its interests in the region. 
These three cases seem to all result in relatively low 
cost policies by a guarantor state in its efforts to maximize 
its corunitment credibility. The evidence here seems to be 
~~ 
supported"real events in international affairs. For example, 
the Soviet and .Arnerican co111.m.tments in Eurone have been :nain-
.&. 
tained at very high levels of credibilty with relatively low 
costs. These costs are certainly below those which would be 
-~ 
expended in a war. Both the Soviet Union and the United States 
have maintained a military presence in Europe since the Se- · 
cond World War and both, now, possess nuclear power of rough-
ly equal scale. These costs result in quite sufficient co···amit-
ment credi bi li ty. 
The United States in both the Pakistan-India rivalry and 
the Greek-Turkish feud chose not to engag·e in f.ighting on ei-
ther side. Instead, the United States used whatever military 
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and jiplo:.natic tactics it thought it could safely apply to the 
two rivals without upsetting its original purposes in the re-
gion. The Lnited States hoped that these tactics would result 
in the stability of the region and, \he:refore, protect the re-
gion froe1 any encroacruient by its rival. Thia policy succeeded, 
somewhat, in Cyprus; it failed miserably in South .Asia. However, 
any other policy would have resulted in :.1ore costs and 1nore 
risks to the guarantor state and with the guarantee that its 
co~ncitment credibility with respect to at least one of the cli-
ent states would be totally destroyed. 
*********** 
:The third case exainined by this thesis, the ful:fillinent 
of an obligation of a defense co~nTJ.tment to a client state 
against a threat launched by a client state of the rival 
Great ?ower, is the rnost difficult and, yet, most iJ1portant 
case study to analyse in terms of risk and the rn.axim.zation 
of commitment er edi bi li ty. It is in such situations that a 
guarantor et ate wi 11 find its elf facing the prospects of a 
limited war in the protection of a cownit1~ent; a limted 
war which could involve significant costs. It is to this 
particular case which this thesis now directs its full at-
tention. 
..  .i: 
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PROHIBITIVE COSTS RESULTING FRClivf LI .,[TED \\TARS 
It has already been determined that a"· guarantor st_ate 
would be probable to fulfill its obligations in a defensive 
commitment to a client state which is threatened by a client 
state of the rival ?ower. It would be rriotivated to do so as 
it would consider the threat to that client state to be a 
test of the resolve of the guarantor state to fulfi 11 its com-
mitrnents. Should it fail to do so, the credibility of all 
its other cor}1:nit::.1ents vis-a¥Vts the rival Power would be se-
verely jeopardized, with the consequent losses of security to 
those client states to which it is com:·utted as well as to it-
self. The guarantor state, then, would. be likely to consider 
that it has :~ore to lose than gain by yielding its obligations 
to the client st ate and not fulfilling the coint'li trnent. 
The only gain the guarantor state would derive from not 
acting in such a situation would be its retention of the co;.n-
I 
ponen·ts of cost ,-1hich were necessary to apply in the fulfill-
••.• ,.,•'d 
rnent of the com~trnent. Thie coat will depenJ on the relative 
.strengths involved and the ar:1ount of assistance the client 
state needs to repel the thr-eat to its security. 
Although this cost :nay be considerable, it seems highly 
unlikely that, with the stakes involved, the· guarantor state 
would. e!Iiploy no cost whatsoever towards the fulfi 11.:::ent of 
. its corird t~ent. Thie would be especially true if the guaran-
tor state were strongly bound to the defense of the client state 
either through a co::nni t:?2ent which i'.Tlpli ed an i~:i.!ledi ate response 
by t}:le guarantor state in the event a serious threat ·1aterializes, 
or if the guarantor state ~naintained a :ni litary presence in the 
client state. 
A fight, then, of son1e sort is likely to develop which 
involves the guarantor state in its fulfillment of its coc1mit-
ment to the client state. If it were to lose in such a fight, 
it would suffer signific·ant losses in prestige, cost, and its 
overall co.-~·1it:!lent credibility. If it is demonstrated to the 
· world that the Great Power cannot protect a client state ser-
ious repercussions would follow as the entire capability of 
that Great ?ower in exerting its power in that and other re-
gions of the world would be very much questioned. But it 
should be noted that a Great ?ower should have (theoretically) 
sufficient power to. at least, sustain any of its client states. 
If it cannot, questions should be raised concerning whether or 
not the guarantor state is, indeed, a Great Power. 
A Great Power, then, can fulfi 11 its com::d ttnent although 
the costs involved could significantly vary. The ?ower is al-
so motivated to do so. The question which needs to be asked, 
therefore, is - How great a cost wi 11 the guarantor state ex-
pend in its fulfi ll!Tient of such a coni:n:i tment? Is there a lim t? · 
If so, where does this limit exist amid what factors determine it? 
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It should be noted that upon the e:nergence of the threat 
to the client state, there ie an i1r.:a."ediate need, on the part of 
the client state for assistance froin the guarantor state. This 
need wi 11 be detere:ined by the degree of threat which exists 
from the third nation and the cost of the assistance will be 
deter·nined by how ~nuch assistance is necessary to relieve the-. 
client state fro,n the threat. 
Ae the guarantor state is highly .'notivated at this point 
to deraonetrate its fulfilluent of the co~rr-ntxient,the amount 
of assistance granted to the client will be deter.nined, to a 
significant degree, by the actual defense needs of the client. 
The defense of this one client, at the outbreak of the threat, 
beco·r:es synonymous with the defense of' all the Great Power's 
client states. There are significant pay-offs, then, to the 
Great ?ower in the expenditure of costs at this point. 
However, one expenditure of costs may not be sufficient to 
preserve the defense o~ the client state. If the threatening 
state chooses to escalate, the existing efforts by the guar-
antor state to protect the defense of the client state may 
no longer be sufficient. To counter this, the guarantor state 
would have to reach another decision either to increase its 
costs or jeopardize the security of the client state at the 
present leve.l of cost. It could also choose to reduce the 
cost or altogether withdraw fro~1 the fulfill:aent of the co,nmt-
men~. 
As long as the guarantor state still believes that the 
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protection of that one client state is still intiu1ately con-
nected with protection of all its other client states, the guar-
... 
antor state will consider that it possesses landslides stakes 
in the client state and, therefore,,will be motivated to con-
tinue the fulfill·:nent of the com:nitment. As such, if the 
guarantor state were to reduce its level of cost to the cli-
ent stat e 1 s protection, or altogether withdraw from its obliga-
tions to co~e to the defense of the client state, not only 
would it still suffer all the losses it would have suffered if 
it had not opted to co;11e to the client•s aid in the first place, 
but the entire justification of the first decision would be 
lost. The first decision to expend costs was done to prevent 
certain losses. A second decision to do eo, if the guarantor 
state believes the stakes are the same, should be n1otivated 
on t he s a:n e b asi s • 
This process can continue over a period of ti.:ne if the 
threat continues and the guarantor state continues to believe 
that the client state is representative of a landslide stake. 
!s a matter of fact, if such conditions prevai 1, the value 
of the original stake in the client state can increase con-
sider abl w. 
(' 
For exa;nple, over a period of time, there will be a con-
tinued need to justify the expenditure of compounding costs. 
These costs, in effect, beco1ne investments which, in then1selves 
M •' 
are necessary to protect •. If a Great ·Power spends x billion 
. 
dollars year after year for ten years in order to prevent the 
72 
. i 
·.t 
loss of a landslide stake, by the eleventh year, if the coun-
,, \'\ 
try still considers the expenditure of ·x billion dollars to be 
necessary to protect the loss of a landslide stake, it should 
t , .. 
be even ~ore willing to spend x billion dollars. This would 
be because not only does the sarne valuable stake have to be 
protected, but the purpose of the investinent of !Ox billion 
dollars. 
In addition, through the Great Power invo lvernent in the 
client state, the guarantor state may have received additional 
priviledges in the client state which strengthen the guarantor 
state's strength or capabilities vis-a-vis its rival. These 
-
may be offered on a quid pro quo basis by the client state in 
an effort to further induce the guarantor state to come to its 
assistance. Or the g~arantor state may demand such advantages 
as a prerequisite for its assistance. Examples of such privi-
ledges would be the use of naval and military bases by the 
guarantor state and an opportunity to increase a guarantor 
state's air power in a region ( especially if the Great Power 
did not have any aircraft carriers in the region.) 
It seems possible, then, that a Great Power could become 
increasingly motivated to continue the fulfill:nent of its com-
mitment to a client state, even if such action resulted in 
escalating costs £or the guarantor state. Will this process 
continue indefi ni tely1 
It is the conviction of this· writer that a Great Power 
wi 11 not choose to expend costs in the fulfillment of one com-
7~ 
-t· 
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mitment beyond a certain point;· if the coat of fulfilling the 
com·::nit~ent beyond that point weakens, rather than strengthens, 
. that Power's credi bi li ty to fulfi 11 its other com.:ni t:nents. 
The understanding of this concept is so irnportant to the devel-
opment of this thesis that further explanation of this point 
is very necessary. 
Even Great ?owers possess only limited resources. Their 
military power is limitless only in the sense of its nuclear 
capabilities through which it can effectively destroy the 
world. In this particular case, however, there are strong 
restraints placed on the Great ?ower not to resort to its nu-
clear strength to protect the client state. The threatening 
state -:nay realize this and, therefore, be able to utilize 
its conventional cap abi li ti es. 
The Great Power, then, would be forced to rely upon its 
conventional capabilities to meet this threat. It rnuat, there-
fore, depend on necessai:ily limited sources of ,.nilitary strength. 
If troops are engaged in battle, lives will be inevitably lost. 
The cost of the com.rtltment, then, will have certain im-
pact on the dornestic affairs of the guarantor stat'·e. A con-
tinuingly high defense budget wi 11 have an inflationary effect· 
on the nation's econony. Furthermore, shif'ts i_n conventional 
military strengths ~nay have to be carried out in order for the 
Great ?ower to bring its military power to· bear upon a parti-
cular region. Not only would t~s probably entail a transfer 
of certain troops from one foreign country to another, it 
,, 
would also be likely to result in an increased nunber of' ~en 
~-,... I ; 
in the ar:ned forces. 
If, then, the impact of these costs upon the guarantor 
state's do·:nestic affairs were to have a significantly detri-
mental effect on the nation's willingness to fulfill the co-~-
mitment, other client states of the guarantor state rnay begin 
to question the resolve_ of the Great Power to come to their 
defense. Furtherl1lore, if the Great ?ower is forced to reduce 
its military presence in one region in order to strengthen its 
position in the one client state, the client states of that 
region will begin to doubt the capability of the Great Power 
to maintain its co:naiitment credibility to the~uselves. This 
irJould be especially apt to occur if the conventional military 
forces of the Great ?ower in that region had been qualitatively 
decisive in protecting the region. 
T·h·erefore, at a certain point of cost, the Great ?ower would 
find that the levels of cost which had been expended originally 
to protect the credibility of its other co:-nnitraents were begin-
ning to have an entirely opposite effect. In other words, no 
longer ie the amount of cost justified by the !'act that its 
expenditure is !naintai.ning the credibility of the Power's other 
CO'Tl!lli tments. At that rate of cost, then, the ui ndi vi si bi li ty 
of commitment u ceases to exists. 
The value 0£ the total stake, then, must be re-evaluated, 
by the decision-makers of the guarantor state. The stake at 
that cost is no longer a lan.:fslide stake and, in fact, is 
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causing, through its protection at that cost, a relative de-
cline in the guarantor state's power as the security interests 
of its other client et ates becoir:e jeopardized. The protection 
of th.e· stake at that cost is resulting in alrnoet the same 
loss es as.~_-_no expendi t urea would have produced. 
The decision-makers, then, rnust seek to reduce the level 
of cost to euch an extent that the cost expenditures no longer 
produce negative results as to their capability and :~oti va-
tion to fulfi 11 other co.::i:n t:nents. At the sa1ne tirne, the de-
ci sion-'.Ilakers cannot ignore the continuing security needs of 
the client state which is threatened. 
The original decision to fulfill the -co:nmit!llent was predi-
cated on the basis that the 111axirnization of· the guarantor 
state's corn:ni t1nent credibility with respect to the one client 
state was necessary to maximize the Power's co,n:nitment credi-
bility to all of its other client states. At a certain level 
of cost, however, not only did this principle cease to apply, 
the exact reverse began to take effect. No longer was the 
maxicization of corrunitrnent credibility to one client state 
resulting in the rn.aximization of credibility of other commit-
ments. To completely retreat from the co~trnent obligations 
and expend no costs towards the client states needs, even 
though resulting in increased capabi li ti es elsewhere ( certain-
ly not in that region) and, perhaps, a momentary relief in 
certain areas of the dornestic life of the Power, would ulti-
mately raise doubts in other client states as to whether or 
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not the guarantor'. Power would do the sa.111e in their case. Fur-
thermore, the guarantor state wouid lose all of its co.-::1ni t.nent 
credibility and stakes in the original client state, as well as 
suffering other similar losses in those client states which 
could be victi"nzed by the same threatening nation. 
The decision-makers, then, will have to re-evaluate the 
fulfillment of their co~:ni tr1ent obligations by asking them-
selves the following question1 How can the credibility of 
their other coznm. t,·1ents be u1axi.tized, while at the sa:n.e ti21.e 
ensuring the security of the client state which is being 
threatened? This will necessitate a "wj_thdrawa.l" from the 
exceedingly high cost level of the fulfillrn.ent of the co2a:-njt-
ment. How this procees can be done, while at the sa'ae ti·.ae 
maximizing the Power's com1nit:nent credibility with respect to 
the client state which is threatened and its other client 
states, is the subject of the next chapter. 
This chapter has atter:1pted to ie,1onstrate the existence of 
the princiole of a "nrohibitive costu i~n-'c.asas where Great ?o-
- ~ . 
were beco·ne involved in liinited wars in the protection of a 
client state to which they are co~n~tted. This prohibitive 
cost becarne very apparent in the United States involve:nent in 
Viet Na:111, although it took sorne time for the decision-makers 
in .America to realize its significance. As the Pentagon Papers 
have drarnati cally revealed, very few of the leaders in Washing-
ton foresaw this problem as they made decisions which increas-
ingly involved United States rnilitary forces in Southeast Asia. 
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One of the decision-m rs who did foresee the problen1e in-
herent in excessiv costs in the fulfill·nent of one com:rJ.t-
raent und er:ni ni ng the er edi bi li ty of other co:n: 1rl. t:!'lent s was 
George Ball. In a me1orandu:rn to President Johnson written as 
early as July 1, 1965, Ball noted: 
"In my observation, the principal anxi-
ety of our I14\TO Alli es is that we have 
beco:rne too preoccupied with an area 
which see:'!lS to them an irrelevance and 
rnay be t e·:1pted in neglect to our NATO 
responsi bi li ti es.. • • On balance, I be-
li eve we would ·11ore seriously undermine 
the effectiveness of our world leader-
ship by continuing the war and deepen-
ing our involvement than by pursuing 
a carefully plotted course toward a 
co:npro·::u e e so 1 uti on.... .<or eov er, the 
11ore rnen we deploy in the jungles of 
South Vi etnarn, the >r1ore we contribute 
to a growing world anxiety and xd st rust. u 1 
B·.a11 was not believed, the costs o'I' the war in Southeast Asia 
rose, and three years later Richard 1'-4. Nixon was able to be 
elected ?resident of the United States because he pro"·.aised 
to reduce the level of the U.S. cost in Vi etnarn. 
1
The Senator Gravel Edition:The Pentagon Papers, (Boston: Bea-
con Press), Vol. IV p. 019 
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)L\INTAINI·NG C01~;fiT1~NT CREDIBILITY IN COHMIT~\1ENI' ,11THDRAWAL 
------ ------ ------ -
··/ 
In an effort to withdraw from a level of cost in the ful-
fi 11_...nent of a com;::J. t11ent in such a way as to maximize its over-
all CO!!Lll tment credi bi li ty, a Great Power should analyse the 
effects each component of cost produces in furthering the com-
rni t'.·nent credi bi li ty of: l. its co:n·rd. t._rient to defend· the x"1irst 
client state fro~2 a threatening nation protected by the Power's 
rival; and 2. its other com·ni.t··aenta to protect its other client 
stat es. 
It will be recalled that costs included such factors as 
money, lives, and (!lateriel e21ployed in an effort to achieve a 
certain policy objective. It would see~n to be rare indeed that 
each of these co!Ilponents would be equally available to the 
Great Power and each of them would be considered equally valu-
able. 
As such, it would follow that at a particular level of 
composite cost which was a prohibitive cost to the Great Power, 
-
one cornponent of the cost may be more responsible for the pro-
hibitive nature of the cost than the others. In other words, 
the vast expenditure. of lives .in the fulfillment of a commit-
ment and its particular consequences may have more of a detri-
mental effect upon the credibility of the Power's commt1nents 
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to other client states than the vast exnenditure of funds. This .. 
particular case would seem to be especially applicable to Great 
?owera run by a democracy where the significant loss of life in 
a li:ti ted. war may have a profound effect on the conscience of 
the population. In the case of the Uni tad States, for exa-11ple, 
scores of billions o~ dollars can be spent by the Jefenee Je-
oartr.nent without causing national riots and the widespread e~-ner-
gence of anti-war groups. However, the loss of 50, 000 Ameri-
can lives did have such an effect and caused widesoread dis-
.... . 
content a:nong the American people. 
It would see:.n,then,that it is easier for a Great Power 
to expend vast su:ns of' ·:noney and Inateri el to protect a cli-
ent state thaQ large a·:.o.ounts of hu1nan lives. One of the great-
est lessens of the U.S. involvent in South Vietnam should 
probably be that decieion-rnakers should very soberly consi-
der the effects of large expenditures of hurnan lives should 
have on a population's support for a war effort to support a 
client state in the name of' a com.::ni tment. 
The U.S. process in withdrawing from Vietnam has recog-
nized this basic principle. 'The Vietna:nization of the war 
is merely a substitution of American ~nanpower by Vietna!nese 
manpower. In the period of Nixon's first administration over 
half a million troops were withdrawn from South Vietnam. In 
addition, assistance was granted to the South Vi etnarnese in 
an effort to strengthen their capacity to defend themselves. 
By the end of 1971, the United Statee forces which were still 
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present in the country_ were ass11ming a de'fensive and base se-
1 
curi ty ro 1 e for the .nai n part. 
The entire "Nixon Joctrine" of which the Vietnarnization _ 
policy is only a small part is based on ihls strategy of re-
d uci ng _,-_aore costly exp endi t ur es from the fulfil l1nent of' co:n-
mi tment obligations and substituting them with more available 
components of cost. Specifically, the Nixon Doctrine states 
that the Url.ted States will "participate in the.defense and 
develop,nent of allies ••• but that A:rierica cannot-and will not-
conceive all the plans, design all the prograns and undertake 
all the defense of the free nations of the world. tr 2 Implied 
in this progra:n is that the United States could provide in-
creased economic and rnilitary aid.to its client states but 
would try to avoid the use of U.S. troops in the fulfillment 
of any com~1it·:!lent.3 It nrl.ght be noted with regard to the Uni-
ted States in Indochina that the United States apparently does 
not consider the cost of air attacks upon guerrilla positions 
in Laos, Caribodia and Thailand, as well as in South Vietnam 
as being of a prohibitive cost. Air attacks against North -viet 
Nam ~ust be considerably rnore costly given the anti-air de-
fensive capabilities of the North Vietna:nese. The United 
States, however, did not consider even these c_osts to be prohi-
bitive, as in Jecember 1972 the United States was willing to 
launch the heaviest air attacks ever on the North Vietna::nese. 
1 
Richard Nixon, nu.S.Foreign Policy for· the.1970'sn, A Report to 
2 _ Congress, February 9, 1972, p. 112 
Nixon, The Second Year of His Presidency (Washington D.O.: 
Congr es si ona.l Quart er ly, 1971), p. 13. 
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The Soviet involvement in Egypt de:nonstrates so:ne of 
these very same principles. In a sense, the Soviet failure 
to send :1.ilitary troops.during the six days of the Israeli at-
tack upon Egypt was a 0 wi thdrawal n from a cost inherent in the 
Soviet commitment to the country. In the years before the 
Israeli attack, the Soviet co;~~nitment to the defense of Egypt 
had steadily expanded as the Soviet stake in the region in-
creased and the Soviet involve~ent in the Egyptian defense 
structure expanded. In fact, as late as ... :ay 2~, 1967, Tass, 
the Russian News Agency asserted: 
"Nobody should doubt that anyone who 
dares to unleash an unprovoked attack 
in the )fi. ddle East wi 11 face not only 
the united force· of the Arab countries, 
but also the deterinined resistance to 
aggression of the USSR and of all the 
the st at es at t ached to peace. 0 1 
This was a fir~ and blatant comnrl.ttnent undertaken and published 
by the Soviet Union to resist any atte·11pts to undermine the 
territorial integrity of such countries as Egypt • 
However, the Israeli attack upon the United Arab Republic 
carne so swiftly that the or_1ly effective tesi stance which the USSR 
could, have given to protect the Egyptians in these six days 
would have been the i ·r1~.1Jediate introd .. uction of Soviet ar::!led for-
ces to the region. To protect Egypt, thteee forces would have 
had to have n1et the Israeli mechanized divisions and drive 
them back. 
This cost was prohibitive to the Soviet Union ae it entailed 
1 
Arab Report and Record, ,'Jay 16-~l, 1967, No. 10, p.16~. 
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too rr.any high risks to the Soviet Union. President Johnson 
warned the Kre:.--ilin leadership during these six days that the 
United States would beco1ne actively involved if the Soviet 
Union introduced their troops to the fighting. The connection, 
then, between the United States and Israel was so strong that _ 
there were significant restraints placed upon the Soviets. In 
addition the Arab position against the Israeli onslaught was 
was extrer.2ely weak. Vaet nu:nbers of Soviet troops were needed, 
o· ... """,~JI. • • 
then, to effectively beat back the Israelis. Further~nore, 
the Soviets knew that even if they deployed such troops they 
would then have to try to counter the overwhelrning Aneri can 
conventional presence in the region. 
The cost of retaliatory measures against the Israeli forces, 
then, was clearly prohibitive to the Spviet Union during the 
six day war. ls a result it chose to withdraw fro:n its corn-
mitrnent to Egypt at that level of cost. To preserve the credi-
bility of its co~·nitrnents to Egypt as well as throughout the 
-,fl. dd 1 e East, however, the Soviets had to expend soLn.e costs to 
the defense of Egypt, 
This was accotnplished by the introduction of substantial 
am.aunts of Soviet weapons to the EgY:_ptia.Re'.'i!nmediately follow-
ing the end of the Israeli aivance. The expenditure of this 
cost did rnuch to maintain the credi bi li ty of the Soviet corn-
mi trn.ent to the defense of the region and, yet, entailed litt-le 
risk to the Soviet Union. In fact, the strengthening of the 
Egyptian ar".lled forces did much to preserve the stability of 
the region as the Egyptians still were not capable of attack-
s, 
ing Israel in any great force, and the Israelis were 1-nore de-
terred fro--n invading across the Suez Canal. It· should be no-
ted that the presence of the Suez Canal, in· and of its elf, helped 
to stabalize the region as it wae a recognizable bor::ier between 
the two forces • 
. Again, in the '1/ar of Attrition, the Soviet Union with-
drew, in a sens6J, from its corrLnit::nent to defend Egypt by re-
fusing to give the Egyptians the offensive capabilities they 
.needed to drive the Israelis fro:n their territory. Instead, 
the Soviets e11ployed costs to the region to preserve the de-
fensi ve capabilities of ~ypt alone. These costs entailed 
much lower risks than those costs which m.ay have given the 
Egyptians the capability to attack the Israeli positions in 
the Sinai. Nasser had wanted offensive weapons during the 
,i-lar of Attrition in 1970, including long range ground-to-
ground '.ni.ssiles and i~G-23's for his own forces. {'foscow r~ 
1 fused, but increased its costs to Egypt in terms of defensive 
ar:rra1nents. 
After the June 1~1ar of 1967 and the subsequent shifts in 
borders between Israel and Egypt, the USSR defensive co::rt:d.t~nent 
to Egypt beca'!le an offensive com. 1ni t·nent as far as such areas 
as the Sinai Peni neula are concerned. The Soviet Uni on has, 
in the years since 1967, refused to be bound to such a co~n.:u.t-
ment in a military sense ae the risks involved in rolling back 
1 
the Israeli arrned forces are certainly prohibitive. ...'8 a 
ibid., July 16-~l, 1970, p. ·z,.26. 
84 
. "·· 
I. 
result, the Soviet union's credibility of its defensive co·n.nit-
ment has been challenged by the Egyptians as they ~ust fully 
realize, after failing to receive the necessary support they 
need to attack Israel, that USSR does not consider itself 
co:n.nitted to defen1 the Sinai Peninsula. The USSR has used 
diplo:natic efforts to force the Israelis to withdraw, but -
this is as far as they wish to go. Such di:fferences see::'.1 to 
have forced Sadat into retaliating against the Soviet pre-
sence in his country in the su:nrner of 1972 as he beca:·1e increasing-
ly pressed by his military generals to either convert the Sa-
vi et defensive presence into tangible gains for the Egyptians. 
1 
or to reduce it. 
The Soviets, however, were able to preserve the credibili-
t_y of their con1r!'li trrient to Egypt for a nulbb er of years, despite 
the fact that their fulfil lnent of their co:::n-rri. tiaent was at a 
lower cost level with lower risks than the Egyptians would 
probably like to have seen. If fact, it hae been. clear, even 
after the.Sadat :nove of 1972, that the Egyptians are still-de-
sirous of Soviet assistance~ even if it only CJ.eans the de-
fensive assistance the Soviets are willing to grant. Future 
events ·nay yet deterraine the degree to which the Soviets will 
be ab le to ·:·.1ai nt ain the credi bi li ty of their co111:ni trnents to 
Egypt at this present level of cost. 
1 
New York Ti~es June 19, 1972, pp.· 1, 14, 15. 
2 
Near Eastern Report, October 25, 1972, p. 187. 
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The Soviet and A::1eri can withdrawals fro:n certain levels of 
· coet inherent in the fulfi 11,nent of a co !l·:J. t~ent were accor:1-
pani ed by a concentration of costs by t·he Great Powers at a low-
er level of risk. Thie, eo far, has resi..ilted in so:ne evidence 
which shows that su-c·h a.-ctions wi 11 strengthen the overall. com-
ci t"1lent credibility of the :Qr.eat ?ower. The actual process of 
this cost-risk reduction has not been discussed, an:i, there-
fore, ieservee the attention of this thesis at this ti:ne. 
An earlier study by this writer and its findings will b.e 
ex·a::tined a.nd-·:.·a.pp1i.~d 1n this connection. 1 This wr-i-ter -in Janua~ 
ry 1972 exa~nined the British withdrawal from Southeast Asia and 
noted eeveral factors which enabled the British to withdraw 
frorn the region and, yet, rr2axi'Uize the credibility of their 
t:o-'"m·:'.·nt,nents in the area. These factors vi 11 now be exainined 
_in the context of this thesis and observations will be offet?ed 
concerning the probabl.e validity t,f the findings of that par-
ticular study. 
First, a caveat concerning the nature of the .study should: 
be offered. Great Britain, even in the 1950 1 s, is not to b.e 
considered as a Great Power, in the context of this thesis. 
Great Britain, at the tirne she was wi thd~wing from Southeast 
Aei a, was cognizant of the fact that she no longer was a Great 
Power. As such, it would follow that she would no longer con-
. sider the loss of the stakes involved to be of a landslide na-
ture. As ~~!,~1 interests were shifting from a global to a re-
1 
Robert C. Korte, uThe Erosion of Co~,dtment", 
471 Readings Paper, Lehigh University, 
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gional nature, the British couli not have considered the loss 
I 
of her ni li tary presence in Southeast Asia as seriously j eo-
pardi zing her alrea::iy reduced status in the world. 
The entire ·r.otivation for Great Britain's withdrawal 
frorn Southeast Asia was to ,:-~aximize the credibility of its 
other :more i~1portant cotn·!li t::ients, particularly in Europe. Bri-
tain, with her persistent economic problems in the 1960's, 
found that the fulfill·nent of h-er cocnni.t:1ents in Southeast 
Asia was inhibiting its capabilities to fulfill her European 
co:rrrl t::1ente. . .. 'is such, the point a.gain appears that countries 
will withdraw fro:r: a certain level of cost in fulfilling a 
cotn'1i t,'1ent, if that 1 evel of cost significantly i rnpai rs either 
its rnotivation or capability to fulfill its other corn:uitc1ents. 
In this sense, the consideration of this particular case study 
ie relevant, as the British wished to acbrl.eve their withdrawal 
in order to r:1axi:-nize the credibility of their other interna-
ti onal · conirni tment s. 
The firEt point worth recognizing is that even after Bri-
tain realized. she was no longer a global power, she tnaintained 
that, in order to ~naxi.rnize the credibility ofl its coin:nit::!lents 
in r.n.ore i-nportant regions, the credi bi li ty of the original 
co:Tuni t~11ent should be maximized in the withdrawal effort. The 
British 1.~lhi te ?aper of 1965, after noting the i·:nportance of 
withdrawing from Southeast Asia, quickly added: 
.. ·- :-.:. 
0 It would be politically irresponsible 
and econo~:ni cally wasteful if our bases were 
abandoned while they are still needed to 
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• . .·. n l pro:·'1ot e peace 1 n the areas concerned ..... 
The British, subsequently, withdrew fro'!'! the region in such 
a way as to ensure, to the greatest extent pdsei ble, that the 
credibility of their com·!dt·uent was '!laximized. In other words, 
the British desired that the co:~1ni t:1ent would be fulfilled as 
:.nuch as possible during withdrawal: that no sudden gaps in 
security would result from the British withdrawal. 
Subse(!uent discussion·· now wi 11 apnly the conclusions of 
that study·to evidence analysed in other case studies. By test-
ing whether or not the conclusions of that report, offered in 
the for-;n of hypotheses, are '.nanifest·ed in other exarnples, the 
validity or li -.rtl tations of these hypotheses can be better iaen-
tifi ed. 
The first hypothesis noted that the British in seeking a 
withdrawal frorn the Southeast Asia region found that their with-
drawal was :nade more successful by spre.ading the fulfillment of 
the com~it1ent to other countries. The British achieved this 
not only through the signing of the Five Power Defense Arrange-
ment for Singapore and }(alaysia adhered to by those two coun-
tries, Britain, New Zealand and Australia; but also because 
the United States was increasing its rni. litary presence in South-
east Asia at the s a?Ue ti .'.le. Britain's COlnrni ttnent s in Southeast 
Asia, then, beca:n.e shared by four other countries. And Bri-
tain's reduction of its '.ni litary deploy~ents in the region be-
1 
Brassey 1 s Annual, 1965, P• :Pl5. 
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Car'.!le overshadowed by the increasing U.S.involvement in South-
p 
east Asia. 
Such tactics appear logical, but as the Soviet Union and 
the United States rnust have learned by now, they are often dif-
ficult to i1nple:nent. The ·mst recent atte:npt is the Nixon Joc-
trine, in which the United States is trying to spread the ful-
fillinent of her co:1...~t:~ents to those countries which, ideally, 
should have a very great stake in the defense of their own 
particular region. However, if the events of the past are 
any indication, the outlook for the future is di~ for the ulti-
rnate success of such afforts. The amount of extra aid the Uni-
ted States had to offer its allies of the ?hilionines and the 
.. -" 
Republic of Korea to ·induce then to engage in the active de-
fense of South VietnaJJ.1should be evidence enough that often 
it is difficult for a Great ?o\1er to find other countries wil-
li.ng to share a iefensive burden - even if that defensive 
burden is in their own region. This !flay si,.aply be a result 
in the difference in capabilities between the Great ?ower and 
other countries in the area. Furtherr.aore, to add to the U.S. 
problerns in sharing its co .. n.:ni.tu1ents to Southeast Asia, many 
of the U.S. allies which had originally undertaken the co1n.nit-
rnent to protect the region through the letter of the SEATO 
treaty, later dropped their support of t~organization :· .... ·. ·-
1United States Security Agreements and Co11mitments Abroad, 
cit., Vols. I & II, pp. 254-256, 1558, 1559. 
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pri::nari ly because of the Vi etna:·.:1 war. 
The s a:'D.e nro b 1 e"'ls s ee:.n to apply to the Soviet· Uni on. 
There is no country aside fro··n the United States which can 
even co:npare with the USSR in technological advance 1uent and re-
source potential. In addition, the Soviet Union has no other 
ally which it could truly rely upon to fulfill any of its co.n-
1lit!nents. As the tendency for revolt in Eastern Europe ~as 
been amply der!lonstrated in t·he past, the Soviets would not 
,, 
be likely to trust any of those states to protect a Soviet stake 
on their own, even if they did possess the necessary capabi 1-
i ti es. 
In. a Great ?ower's withdrawal fron1 the fulfillrnent of a 
co.n'ni t1~ent, then, the ful 1 app li cation of' this hypothesis has 
yet to be tested. The trrost significant test case ··nay be the 
Nixon ·Joctrine in the forr.n of Vietna1'.lization. However, the 
_ultirnate success of this Doctrine has yet to be revealed as 
the crisis and threat to the security of the South Vi etna·nese 
Goverrunent has not yet en:ied. In the ;neantirne, what is evi-
dent is that Great O Powers find it difficult to be able to 
substantially share the fulfillm.ent of their defensive co~-n-
rni t1nent s. 
Another hypothesis which appeared in that study asserted 
that a co~n·m.tment withdra,..,al ·:nust only be achieved when the 
security of the client state is not seriously jeopardized. 
Otherwise, the credi bi li ty of its co.nrn. t,nents would suffer 
substantially, especially those CO'.'Yl':dt;:nents to the .threatened 
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region. In this connection, the British did not reduce their 
military nresence in Southeast Asia until after the threat to 
·.falaysia in North Borneo had subsided. 
The Soviet presence in Egypt reflects on the validity of: 
·thi:s hynothesis. The Soviet failure to adequately fulfill 
its co~:in:it:~ent to Egypt during the course of the Six Day lA!ar, 
when Egyptian security was ·severely j eopf!'rdized, did have a 
t 
da~naging effect on the Soviet Union's co-1ut:1ent credibility 
to Egypt. It took eignifi cant effort on the part of the So-
viets to repair the da·:nage done. Although this has :net with 
some success, it has been noted that the Soviets are still 
suffering,eo.~ewhat,a loss of co·:rni.trnent credibility, at least 
with regards to the Israeli occupied sections of Egypt. 
The A:nerica.n cor'.!'nitment to Pakistan is another case in 
point. The U.S. with~lrawal fro~-:i its comnt:ltment to Pakistan 
in 1965 through its a.<:-ne e·,nbargo placed on the region, seri-
ously threatened the security of ?akistan as the threat 
from India was very great at thi e particular ti11:e. The sub-
seouent loss of the U.S. com~nitment credibility to Pakistan 
. eventually resultei in the deterioration of the U.S.-Pakistani 
alliance. 
But this thesis has tried to show that under certain 
. circu11stances a Great ?ower rnust make withdrawals fro21 certain 
cost levels inherent in a co?n:uit[nent. In this sense, then, 
the hyoothesis ioes not hold true because so·netir.aee a Great 
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?ower must cut its costs in a region, or, in the case ofa' 
two conflicting client states, altogether with~raw its obli-. 
gations to protect the:n should they attack each other. 
Yet another hypothesis offered in the study on the Bri-
tish withdrawal fro:r. Southeast Asia suggested that consulta-
tions concerning the nature of the withdrawal should be under-
taken with those countries affected by the withdrawal. This 
would be a prerequisite for the guarantor state's rc.axi:.aization 
of its cot~cdtment credibility as the intent of the guarantor 
state's actions could be fully explainei to the client· state. 
I 
Logically, it would see·~n to be of value to the guarantor 
-
state to :nake its :noti ves clearly understood to the client 
state. Such consultations would have to 1nake clear to the 
client state that the guarantor's support for the de~ense of 
the client state is too costly and seriously undermines its 
ability or (aoti vati on to fulfi 11 other co-:n1rl. tw.ents. If an 
explanation :of the guarantor state's future actions in ex-
pending less costly ::1eans of support could be given to the 
client state and an agreement could be reached which both 
sides agree would 1naintain the security ·of the client state, 
then the corn'ni tment credibility to that client state would 
certainly be :naintained. 
Therefore, consultations and agreetnents are neceesary pre-
requi si tee to a succeEsful conwi t::i.ent withdrawal. The Uni-
ted States ~aintained constant consultation's with Vietnam dur-
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· ing its wi th:irawal f'roin its active ground involve::nent in the 
war. The United States ·.~otives .:r.ust have been clearly pre-
sented to South Vietnam and South Vi etna.11 had to agree, if 
for no other reason, because they had no choice. A-neri ca was 
the only country in the world capable and willing to co;ne 
to their aid. In the U.S.-Pakistani case, however, despite 
the fact there were consultations between the .governinents, · 
t·he Pakistanis could not accent the A~eri can wi thd.ra\1al from 
a co.n~nit,nent which they considered to be vital to their securi~ 
ty. In this case, an agree.rrient on principles was not reached 
and the U.S. co~ru~it1nent to Pakistan suffered a consi-ierable 
loss in cre:ii bi li ty. 
The final point which the study noted in the British 
withdrawal w·as that the British exit succeeded partially because 
it wa.s carried out over a long period of ti me - a nu~nber of 
years. During the late 1960's and early 1970's, the Bri-
tish gradually turned over their mlitary installations to 
the countries of the region for their own defensive use. As 
a result, no sudden gaps in the security of the region were 
apparent as the British reduced their involvernent in the 
area. 
Thie principle has been the basis of the entire U.S. 
withdrawal fro:n South Vietna_rn. Such a withdrawal c:aximized 
not only the U.S. co.:'!1:ni truent to South Vi·~natn but also those 
co~'Lni tments of the LTni ted States to other parts of the world. 
9~ 
President Nixon, in com."!lenting about a sudden U.S. disengage-
ment fro'.n South Vi etrram while a substantial threat sti 11 exi s-
· ted to the country, asserted: 
' 
"Pr ecei pit ate dis engag e'nent, without re-
gard to conse~uences, would have made impos-
sible our efforts to forge a new foreign poli~ 
cy. It rnight have been ·do.·nesti cally popular 
for a short term, but as,its consequences be-
ca'.:2e clear, the agony of recri_·-n nation would 
have replaced the agony of war. Overseas, 
this course would have shaken the trust of 
our friends and earned the cont e"..lpt of our 
adversaries. ,•le could not begin to build 
new partnerships by turning our back on peo-
ple who had co--1e to count on our support. 
And we could not set out to negotiate with. 
advers_ari es by abandoning allies. n 1 
The United States, therefore, gradually reduced the nu:·!lbers 
of its troops in 1Jietna~ over a period of fq,µr years. At the 
'°Barn~_ tie1e, the fighting capabilities of the South Vietna:nese 
b:eca·r1e the object of :nany ef.forts of improvernent. The goal 
w-as to re:iuce the Arnerican ihv:oJve_,:r.ient while protecting Viet.-
na:,.4_es ·e security. 
This chapte-r :has atternpted to denonstrate the rel·at·i·Vely 
:different effec1:.,s. the various co_0ponents of cost can hav-e ion. 
~: ,guarantor st at. e'' s -~~axt. ··1i.z:.ati pn <)f its co :i·ai trnent s. If one ·· 
cornponent of .c_·ost results i.n higher risks that the gua.rgnt,o,r. 
state's credibility of its -co.r1;nit,::.1ent,s to states,other than 
the state to which the cost, is applied, will considerably suf-
fer; then the guarantor state will seek to cut back on the 
expenditure of that cost. The co,1poi1ent-af cost which is likely 
1 
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'-to have this effect -:.ore. 't:han any other co·_10-oh'erit, ·of :cos:t 
would a!)pear to i.nvolve the. 11:u:_nan elei:1ent~ 
Also, frofr! th analysis e~bodied .in this cha~ter, it .s'ee::::is: 
that the best way to reduce a level-. of cqst in the ful:fi ll.,tent, 
of any particular co~:.:itr>1ent to gradually eli:·nln--13.te t.hat c.o,a-
ponent of cost qv·e .. r ·a period of tt<2e. This sho_u1_·q. b·e a¢.c_b·:j~, 
p li shed in s.u.ch a .ctanner that no security prob lei~s ·art s·.e ·\·o 
·t:be client st at-e as a res ult. To further increase the char1c:.e.~i 
.o.f success of su·ch a policy, i::t woµlj ap;rear that the gu~r:anto.r 
its al1i es·. or· th-.e ,c:li:ent st,·ate i:tself . . - . . 
. ' . ·--• 
-~ guaran:tQ.r· ,_~ta.t e ·to re1uce its costs o.f: .fulfilling -~ com.1nit-
.. ~nent. and' wa.xi,n ze its overall co :1~nt-·:e.nt cr~c:li bi lit_y:, 
9 .. 5 
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CONCLUSIONS 
The entire purpose of this thesis has been to examine 
Great 0 ower behavior in the fulfi llrnent of military co·11..:rl tments 
in an effort to work towards a !nore co:nprehensive theory of 
.Great Power policies in such situations. As such, the thesis 
has atte.~pted to categorize the relationships between a guar-
antor Great Power and its client states and to deter·nine, on 
the basis of logic and case studies, how the Great Power would 
seek to fulfill its co"n~:it,nents. The ·najor findings of thie 
thesis are as follows. 
Great Power behavior in the fulfill"'lent of any co:~t- · 
~ent to a client state wi 11 differ considerably, depending on 
the source of the threat to the client state. 
If the threat ori,ginates from the guarantor's Great Po-
wer rival, the guarantor state will be highly ,notivated to 
take whatever action necessary to protect the client state, 
as such positive measures are likely to 1naintain the existing 
deterrent relationship between the Great ?owere. The Great 
Power will be able to achieve this effect through relatively 
low cost policies which would include the :naintenance of a 
mi.litary presence in the client state and the continued pos-
ture of a nuclear second strike capability. 
If the threat e~ninates frorn a third nation not protected 
by any Great ?ower security comrntn1ent, the guarantor state 
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. possesses eignifi cantly great capabi li ti es to protect the cli-
ent state. As such, it can expend costs very efficiently in 
the fulfillment of any obligation to urotect the client fro:n 
such threats with a relatively s:nall degree of risk. This 
third nation, therefore, is not very likely to threaten such 
a client state, and, if it desired to do so, it would probably 
seek eo:~e form of a security guarantee fro~ a Great Power be-
fore engaging in any hostilities. 
If a client state of the Great Power's rival threatens a 
client state of the guarantor state, the chances that a li:ni-
ted war would result are significant •. .\Great Power would 
be highly motivated to extend assistance to the client state 
as it wot,.1ld believe that if it did not do so, the credibility 
of all of its co~1:nit··1ents would be substantially reduced. How-
. ever, depending on the conventional forces involved, the cost 
of such an involvernent to a Great '?o\tfer could beco;ne very hig·h 
and even pro hi bi ti ve if the cost of :Culfi llGent jeopardized 
either the :'1otivation or capability of the guarantor state 
to fulfill its re!naining co'1rrit1nents. If this situation eLUer-
ges, the guarantor state wi 11 seek to reduce that cornponent of 
cost which is resulting in the greate~t loss of com:a t~nent 
credibility., ~,t the sarne time, however, it will continue to 
fulfi 11 its com·'.j_ t:nent obligations to the threatened client 
state at a level of cost which will not impair the credibility 
of its other corruni t ~nent s. 
The case where two client states of a guarantor power are 
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threats to each other's security, in a sense, represents the 
rnost difficult di le;11.nas for a Great ?ower as it t1ay lose con-
trol over events. The Great Power will attempt not to take 
sides in the differences between the two states as its inter-
ests are served by harJ1ony and not by discord between the two 
client states. Both states :nay very well co:ne to believe that 
the guarantor state's proclairned neutrality in the dispute 
is a retreat fron its pledge to assist in maintaining their 
individual security. If either of the states feel that their 
security interests are substantially threatened by this re-
fusal of the Great ?ower to corne to their aid, they :nay seek 
security guarantees frora other nations, if such nations ·are 
capable and willing. If the original intent of the guarantor's 
security coin:::i t:nent, however, is ~ore i:11portant to the client 
state''s security than the threat fro •. n its client state rival, 
then the client state would have to accept certain restraints 
in its policies in an effort to preserve the co.'.ll:1it:nent rela-
tionship with the guarantor Power. 
:-~· \ 
In each case analysed in this thesis, the Great Power's 
actions in the fulfi ll'J.ent of its cotnr~i t,.nents could be explained 
· ·· by the acceptance of the hypothesis that Great ?owers wi 11 al-
ways seek to maxi .rrii z e their corn:ni t:nent credi bi li ty. Usually, 
the maxi rni zati on of the credi bi li ty of one corncai trnent results 
in an overall '-naximization of co'omit.rnent credibility. How-
ever, there are limits which apply here, and· they co:'!le into 
effect if the cost of the fulfi ll~nent of one comtn t:-a.ent ex-
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ceeds a certain point. - However, even in these cases, Great ?o-
wers will base their policies on the f.naxi-ai.zation of their over-
all com·nit:nent credibility giving first priority to the bulk 
of its com-:rrl.t~ents and, then, consideration of the 'uaxi:nization 
of its co:.!l?rJ.ttnent credibility with respect to the threatened 
client state. 
These have been the general principles uncovered by this 
thesis. ·Cominent shall now be of'fered on what this thesis has 
not done. 
It, of course, has not analysed those situations of com:ni t-
ment excluded by the assu:nptions and lirni tations of this the-
sis. This was necessary in order to contentrate attention to 
the subject matter of this study as well as to make the data 
involved in this study so:newhat nore ;nanageable. Any further 
stu:ly of nation-state behavior in the fulfillrnent o~ military 
co·n:ni tr!lents would have to analyse non-Great ?ower co;nm tments, 
eepeci ally "sub-Great Power" corn~ni tin.ents. A sub-Great ?ower 
would be a nation of conBiderable strength, no where near as 
great as a Great Power's, but with a nuclear capacity of s:2all 
scope. How such a nation would be likely to fulfill a co·n:nit-
~nent obligation to a client state would see1n to be a very in-
teresting topic. 
Offensive co:'.Ttlt:nents were also beyond the range of this 
present study. Frorn this analysis of Great Power behavior, it 
is Quite evident that Great Powers shun such cornrni.tments. But 
are other nations likely to do this? And if they do asswne 
l ...• 
1i . 
' 
i 
l 
I· 
·,. 
. 1 
euch co·~m.tments, what will be the conditions, against whom 
wi 11 the corsrrl. tnenta be directed, and how wi 11 they be fulfilled? 
Beyond this, there are ·-ria.ny gaps still present in the analy-
sis ern~loyed by this thesis. This is due largely to the fact 
that 1ata, so desperately needed to test the validity of cer-
tain relationships and factors outlined in this thesis, is 
/ 
sti 11 lacking. The ulti·nate outco.::e, for exarnple, of the A'!leri-
can presence in Southeast Asia and the Soviet Union in the !1rti.d-
dle East, placed in their proper historical context and per-
spective, shall re·:a.ained veiled in the future for so:ne ti·:ie. 
In the meantime, research rnust sift through the current events 
of international affairs in a search for patterns in a world 
so eee:cingly dorninated by chaos. 
; . 
·, 
J 
• .-4"; 
100 
,: 
.j. 
---:,.i 
. , 
,, .... ,·~.-. . ... , 
' ·". 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
PUBLIC DOCU.,~ENTS 
,w,:: 
-
The Senator Gravel Edition:_ The Pentagon ?apers. Vol .• r·v-•. 
Bostons Beacon Press, 1971 
United States Foreign Policy for the 1970' s: The Ernerging w 
-
... ~ Structure of Peace. Richard >f. Nixon. Report to the 
Congress. -United States Governi~ent ?rinting Office, 
February 9, 1972. 
"unit.ed States Security Agree·:ente an::i C'.:irlt:nents Abroad." 
Hearings before the Subco,~rtittee on United States 
Security -~ree~1ents and Co n:·ni tt,r1ents Abroad of the 
Co::::rri ttee on Foregn Relations, United States Sen8te. 91st Congress. Vols. I and II. 
United States Treaties and other Intern.ational Agree:2ents. 
United States lepart,'1ent of State, 1955. Part I, Vol. 6. 
United States Treaties and other International Agreerrents. 
united States Ueoart~.aent of' State, 1959. ?art I, Vol. 10 .• 
BOOKS 
Bhutto, Zulfikar Ali. The -1yth of Indi,9endence. London, 1969 • 
Calvocoressi, Peter. International Politics Since 1945. New 
York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 19l8. 
Khan, 14:>har~ad ~ub. Fri ends not >!asters. London: Oxford 
University ?ress, 1967. 
Khan, £-bha:1~ad: Jyub. Pakistan Perspective. Printed in 
United States by the E'.1bassy of Pakistan. 
Laguer, Walter Ze' ev. The Soviet Union and The )dddle East. 
-- ---- --- ---New York, 1959. 
Laquer, lt/alter Ze' ev. The Struggle for the ~\lfi.ddle East. New 
York, 1969. 
Lawson, Ruth C., ed. International Regional Organi;ations. 
New york, 1962. 
101 
., 
~· 
r, 
' 
~cheal, Franz H.: and George E. Taylor. The Far East in the_ 
---------
·~od ern '~vo r ld. New York, 1964. 
Ra' anan, Uri. The USSR Ar'"ns the Thi rd World: Gase Studies in 
Soviet Foreign ?o1I cy. ca.,!lbridge, 1ass,: :·Il·T- Press~ 19(9. 
-----~ -- .. - ---
Rosencrance, R. N. Jefense of the RealCT. New York: Co lu:Jbi a 
Univereity ?ress, 19b8. - ·-
Vital, ':·avid. The ~·~a.king of British Foreign Policy. New York, 1968. 
-- ---- _.._..., ~ _, 
Wopdhouse, C • . {. British Foreign ?olicy Since the Second World 
War • Londo· n, l 9f 1 • --· 
- - --
ti 
:Ziring, Lawrence. The Ayub Khan Era. Syracuse, 1971 • 
. ARTICLES 
13·100P1field, Lincoln P. and -~tvnelia C. Leiss. "Ar·rls Transfers and 
Ar·11s Cont ro 1 °, Soviet- A,::ieri can Riv al ry in the ~~ dd 1 e 
East. J. C. Hurewitz: ed. Colu::1bia University, 1969:. 
Joynt, C. B. and O. M.Saiolansky. uSoviet Naizal Policy in the .·1e.di-
terranean", Depart<::ent of International Relations Research 
:~nograph I~o. 3. Lehigh University, 1972. 
\-1'.arner, Geoffrey. uThe United States and Vietnan1 1945-19(5 Part I, 
1945-54 11 • International Atifairs. ( London) Vol. 48, No. 3, 
(July 1972), pp. 379-394. 
t~rarner, Geoffrey. "The United States and Vietnam 1945-1965 PartII, 
1954-19€5." International ~ftffai re. ( London) Vol. ·48, No. 4, 
(October 1972), pp. 593-~15. 
Wilcox, Wayne. "Pakistan 11 • Asia and the International Syste~n. 
1tvayne t~i lcox, Leo E. Rosa-and Gavin Boyd, eds. ca~nbridge, 
Aass.: Winthrop ?ublishers, Inc., 1972. 
PERIODICALS 
Arab Report and Record. 1966-1971. 
Braseeyts Annual. 1962~1970. 
De ad 1 i ne 1J at a. " .. ·.1Ia 1 ay si a" , " .-~ ro c co u , n Si ng ap o re u • 
102 
Near East Report. 19.7o~i9·7·2. •F 
---. 
New York Tirnes. 
LJN=>UBLISHED . .iIATERI AL 
,. 
1
.'1 eb'er, Ray:!:ond Willi an1. "The Soviet TJni on in the :~ft dd 1 e East", 
Unpublished .1 aster•s Thesis. Lehigh University, 1965. 
OTHER SOURCES 
Lehigh University, Bethlehein, Pennsylvania. Lecture by D:r. Carey 
B. Joynt, ?rofessor and Chair~an ·of the Departrnent of 
International Relations, Nove··nber 10, 1970. 
,. 
1,,- • 
i· 
VITA 
Robert Charles Korte wae born on February 4, 1950 in New 
Haven, Connecticut and is the son of 1.fr. and ~-~rs. Herbert F·. 
Korte of Hamden, Connecticut. He is a 1967 graduate of Harnden 
High School, Ha:'!lden, Connecticut, and a 1971 graduate of Lehigh 
University frora which he graduated with high honors and "Jepart-
~nental Honors. In Septe·mber 1971, he began his studies at Le-
high University for the _.-faster of Arts Degree and was also e.n-
ployed by the International Relations 1Jepartment. of Lehigh Uni-
versity as a teaching assistant. 
·:·-., 
; ' 
104 
.,i. 
IC 
I 
